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INTRODUCTION
This appeal is from the trial court's denial of a motion to compel arbitration. The
trial court held that Wolf Mountain could not amend its pleadings to add more parties to
this action because the contract at issue mandates arbitration, but then held that Wolf
Mountain could not compel arbitration because it had waived its right to arbitrate by
engaging in litigation.
However, this Court has held that arbitration is highly favored, there is a strong
presumption against waiver of arbitration, the party proving waiver bears a heavy burden,
and arbitration will not be deemed waived absent proof that a party intended to disregard
its right to arbitrate, either explicitly or as inferred by (1) its participation in litigation and
(2) any resulting prejudice to the opposing party.
The trial court's waiver ruling should be reversed because none of these criteria
have been met. First, Wolf Mountain understood and asserted to the trial court that the
parties' arbitration agreement did not permit Wolf Mountain the right to seek arbitration.
Summit County agreed with Wolf Mountain's assessment. By its express statements,
Wolf Mountain did not waive - "intentionally relinquish a known right to" - arbitration.
Second, Wolf Mountain's participation in litigation is insufficient to infer an intent
to waive arbitration because the parties have engaged in primarily fact discovery and
pretrial motions. "If participation in discovery and pretrial motions, standing alone,
irrespective of the parties' intentions, were to constitute waiver of the right to arbitrate,
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the strong policy favoring arbitration would be damaged." Cent. Fla. Invs., Inc. v.
ParkwestAssocs., 2002 UT 3, \ 33, 40 P.3d 599.
Third, ASCU is not prejudiced by the conduct of fact discovery to date in this case
because it admits (and even demands) that such discovery pertains both to arbitrable and
nonarbitrable claims. "[N]o prejudice results if the discovery relates to nonarbitrable
claims which will be severed and separately litigated." Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue
Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 359 n.17 (Utah 1992).
Finally, even if Wolf Mountain's actions did meet the applicable tests for waiver which they do not - waiver of arbitration under Section 78-3 la-4 of the Utah Arbitration
Act violates the Utah Constitution. The jurisdiction of district courts is "limited by this
constitution or by statute." UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 5;see also id. art. V § 1; VI, § 1.
Section 78-3 la-4 of the Utah Arbitration Act mandates: "The court, upon motion of any
party showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to
arbitrate." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4 (1999) (emphasis added). By its plain terms,
arbitration "shall" be ordered, and ordering arbitration is "the essence o f the statutory
scheme. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold otherwise.
Ultimately, whether the SPA Agreement requires arbitration is not at issue on this
appeal. The issue is whether Wolf Mountain waived arbitration under that Agreement.
Under these circumstances, Wolf Mountain did not. Indeed, under careful constitutional
scrutiny, Wolf Mountain may not. Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's
ruling that Wolf Mountain waived arbitration under Section 78-3 la-4 and remand this
case to the trial court for further proceedings.
2

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court's jurisdiction arises under Utah Code Ann. §§ 78-31a-19 (1999) and
78A-3-102 (2009).
ISSUES PRESENTED
Issue #1: Whether the trial court erred in holding that Wolf Mountain waived its
statutory right to arbitrate the disputes in this action that arise under the parties' "SPA
Agreement." This issue turns on three subsidiary issues:
1.

Whether Wolf Mountain's participation in the litigation prior to the trial

court's determination that it must arbitrate with the Third Parties constituted a "knowing
and intentional relinquishment" of its right to arbitration under the SPA Agreement;
2.

Whether Wolf Mountain "substantially participated in the underlying

litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate" prior to filing its Motion to
Compel Arbitration when the parties have engaged in primarily fact discovery and related
pretrial motions; and
3.

Whether Wolf Mountain's "participation in the litigation . . . resulted in

prejudice to" ASCU when the evidence of arbitrable and nonarbitrable claims is identical.
Standard of Review.
"[Wjhether a trial court correctly decided a motion to compel arbitration is
a question of law which [this Court] review[s] for correctness, according no
deference to the trial judge." Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 at % 10; see also Baker v.
Stevens, 2005 UT 32, If 7, 114 P.3d 580. "[W]hether a contractual right of
arbitration has been waived presents mixed questions of law and fact: whether the
3

trial court employed the proper standard of waiver presents a legal question which
is reviewed for correctness, but the actions or events allegedly supporting waiver
are factual in nature and should be reviewed as factual determinations, to which
[appellate courts] give a district court deference." Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3, f
20. However, where, as here, the trial court conducted no evidentiary hearing, and
even permitted no oral argument regarding the Motion to Compel Arbitration (R.
4007), any deference to the trial court's factual determinations is minimal. See,
e.g., McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 1999 UT App 199, \ 10, 980
P.2d 694 (holding that when "the trial court also based its denial of [the motion to
compel arbitration] on affidavits and other documentary evidence without
conducting an evidentiary hearing," the "decision was a legal conclusion and
therefore, we review it for correctness, according no particular deference to the
trial court's decision." (citations and quotations omitted))).
Preservation. These issue were the subject of Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel
Arbitration (R. 3339-51), and of the decision below (R. 4028-34.).
Issue #2: Whether the requirement of court-ordered arbitration pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 78-3 la-4 (1999) is mandatory and jurisdictional, including pursuant to Utah
Const. Art. V, § 1, Art. VI § 1, and Art. VIII §§3 and 5, and thus cannot be abrogated by
a party's waiver, in contraction to this Court's two-part test for waiver applied in
Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833 P.2d 356, 360 (Utah 1992) and its progeny.
Standard of Review. "c[M]atters of statutory construction are questions of law
that are reviewed for correctness.'" Esquivel v. Labor Cornrn'n of Utah, 2000 UT 66, ^f
4

13, 7 P.3d 777 (citations and quotations omitted). Likewise, "because interpreting the
Utah Constitution presents a question of law, we review the trial court's determination for
correctness and give no deference to its legal conclusions." Grand County v. Emery
County, 2002 UT 57, \ 6, 52 P.3d 1148 (citations omitted). Finally, "[t]he determination
of whether a court has subject matter jurisdiction is a question of law, which we review
for correctness, according no deference to the district court's determination." Beaver v.
Qwest, Inc., 2001 UT 81, f 8, 31 P.3d 1147, 1149 (citations omitted).
Preservation. This issue was addressed in Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel
Arbitration (R. 3781-95, see esp. 3789-90). This issue was acknowledged by the trial
court in its Ruling (R. 4023-24.), but the trial court did not address it.
DETERMINATIVE LEGAL PROVISIONS
Utah Constitution Art. 1, § 26:
The provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless
by express words they are declared to be otherwise.
Utah Constitution Art V, § 1:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging to
one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining to either
of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or permitted.
Utah Constitution, Art. VI § 1:
(1) The Legislative power of the State shall be vested in:
(a) a Senate and House of Representatives which shall be designated the
Legislature of the State of Utah; and
(b) the people of the State of Utah as provided in Subsection (2).
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Utah Constitution, Art VIII § 3:
The Supreme Court shall have original jurisdiction to issue all
extraordinary writs and to answer questions of state law certified by a court
of the United States. The Supreme Court shall have appellate jurisdiction
over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute, and power to
issue all writs and orders necessary for the exercise of the Supreme Court's
jurisdiction or the complete determination of any cause.
Utah Constitution, Art. VIII § 5:
The district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as
limited by this constitution or by statute, and power to issue all
extraordinary writs. The district court shall have appellate jurisdiction as
provided by statute. The jurisdiction of all other courts, both original and
appellate, shall be provided by statute. Except for matters filed originally
with the Supreme Court, there shall be in all cases an appeal of right from
the court of original jurisdiction to a court with appellate jurisdiction over
the cause.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-31a-4(l) (1999):
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an
arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an issue is
raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope of
the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine those issues
and order or deny arbitration accordingly.
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration
agreement is involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court
having jurisdiction to hear motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall
be made to that court. Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a court with
proper venue.
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action
or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement.
However, if the issue is severable from the other issues in the action or
proceeding, only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed. If a motion is
made in an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include a
stay of the action or proceeding.
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded on a
claim that an issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds
for the claim have not been shown.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case.
Wolf Mountain leases real property located in Summit County to ASCU pursuant

to a certain "Ground Lease." The Ground Lease includes property on which The
Canyons Resort is located. In this case, each party alleges (among other claims) that the
other breached the Ground Lease, which incorporates additional duties under a certain
land development agreement called the "SPA Agreement." The SPA Agreement contains
an arbitration clause. The parties dispute whether Wolf Mountain has waived - or even
can waive - its statutory right to arbitration under the SPA Agreement.
B.

Course of Proceedings.
In 2006, Wolf Mountain served upon ASCU a Notice of Default under the Ground

Lease and notified ASCU that it would terminate the Ground Lease if ASCU failed to
cure the default. (R. 236-40.) In response, ASCU filed its Complaint in this case,
followed by an Amended Complaint, claiming that Wolf Mountain had breached the
Ground Lease, including its duties to assist in land development pursuant to the parties'
SPA Agreement, which the Ground Lease incorporates. (R. 223-60.) Wolf Mountain
counterclaimed, asserting ASCU's breaches of the Ground Lease and several other
claims. (R. 711-70.) Wolf Mountain also filed a separate action against ASCU and
others under the Ground Lease. (R. 771-817.) Those cases and others were consolidated
into this current case. (R. 577-78.)
Throughout this litigation, it has been commonly understood that only Summit
County had the right to seek arbitration of disputes under the SPA Agreement's
7

arbitration clause. In fact, on April 24, 2009, Wolf Mountain again argued at the trial
court that the arbitration provision does not apply because Summit County had not
declared a default per the terms of that provision. (R. 3164 (66:11-69:4).)
On March 12, 2009, Wolf Mountain filed a Motion to Amend its pleadings to add
other SPA Agreement parties to the litigation that had refused to give land to the new golf
course design as third party defendants, on the ground that all parties needed to be before
the trial court as part of any remedy regarding the new design of the golf course. (R.
2490-91, 2013-28.) On April 29, 2009, the trial court denied Wolf Mountain's Motion to
add other parties, concluding that the SPA Agreement "require[s] arbitration" and that
"any claim by Wolf that the SPA agreement was violated in some way is subject to the
mandatory arbitration provision in that agreement." (R. 3082.)
Accordingly, on May 15, 2009, Wolf Mountain filed a Demand for Arbitration
against all parties to the SPA Agreement that had not given land for the new golf course
design, including both third parties and ASCU. (R. 3339-51.) In addition, on May 20,
2009, Wolf Mountain filed its Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 3339-42.)
C.

Disposition in the Trial Court.
On June 26, 2009, the trial court entered its Ruling and Order denying Wolf

Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration without oral argument. (R. 4005-36.) The
court held that "the issues in dispute in this case may very well be arbitrable under the
broad arbitration provision of the SPA Agreement," but denied Wolf Mountain's Motion
because it held that Wolf Mountain "has waived its right to arbitration by its actions to
this juncture." (R. 4028-34.) This appeal followed.
8

D.

Statement of Facts.
In 1997, pursuant to a certain "Ground Lease," Wolf Mountain leased the real

property (the "Property") now known as "The Canyons Ski Resort" to ASCU and
American Skiing Company, Inc., ASCU's parent company ("ASC"). (R. 223 at Exh. A.)
Under the Ground Lease, ASCU is required to pay Wolf Mountain annual rent payments.
(R. 223 at Exh. A, p.2-5.) More importantly, ASCU is required to "produce and submit
to Summit County for approval, and exercise its best efforts to maintain in place a master
plan" to complete residential and commercial real development of 5,000,000 square feet
of the Property. (R. 223 at Exh. A, p.28.) When it develops a parcel of the Property,
ASCU is required to pay Wolf Mountain 11% of the costs of constructing the buildings
and improvements included in the development. (R. 223 at Exh. A, p.27.) Accordingly,
ASCU's development of the Property is the source of the vast majority of ASCU's
payments to Wolf Mountain under the Ground Lease. (Id. p.2-5, 27.)
Pursuant to the Ground Lease, and to direct the development of the Property and
surrounding parcels, in 1999, ASC, ASCU, Wolf Mountain, Summit County, and
numerous landowners who are not parties to this litigation (the "Third Parties") entered
into a certain Amended and Restated Development Agreement for the Canyons Specially
Planned Area (the "SPA Agreement"). (R. 3343-51 at Exh. A.)
There are approximately 33 Third Parties, many of which are smaller entities or
family partnerships. (R. 3343-51 at Exh. A (signature pages).) In addition, the SPA
Agreement affects 7768 acres of land. (Id. at Exh. A p.l.) The SPA Agreement's terms
and conditions "run with the land," and the Agreement is also "binding on the successors
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and assigns of the Developers in the ownership or development of any portion of the
Property." {Id. at Exh. A p.63, 65.)
The SPA Agreement provides for orderly and expedited development of the
Property and surrounding parcels under the direction of Summit County. (R. 3343-51 at
Exh. B, p.2-4.) The SPA Agreement requires, inter alia, that ASCU complete the
construction of a public golf course on the Property (the "Golf Course"), and that the
parties reach an agreement by February 13, 2000 to set aside lands for the construction of
the Golf Course. (R. 3343-51 at Exh. B, p.29.) To date, ASCU has not begun
construction of the Golf Course.
Beginning in 1999, ASCU's parent company, ASC, experienced significant
financial difficulties. ASC has since filed articles of dissolution. (R. 3330-3333.)
Beginning in 2000, ASCU's development of the Property dropped dramatically. (R. 67277.) In addition, beginning in 2002, Summit County placed ASCU in several "soft
defaults" of the SPA Agreement due to ASCU's failure to construct the Golf Course. (R.
4541 at Exh. A at 8 flf 23).) In 2004, ASCU and Summit County negotiated a standstill
agreement, halting ASCU's development of the Property until ASCU completed the
construction of the Golf Course. (R. 231 at f 28, 4541 at Exh. A at 9 flf 27).)
In 2006, Wolf Mountain had issued multiple Notices of Default to ASCU under
the Ground Lease, alleging that ASCU had failed to transfer the land underlying a
proposed 35-lot subdivision, improperly pledged the Ground Lease as collateral, and
substantially altered Wolf Mountain's own lease of a major portion of the Property
without even notifying Wolf Mountain. (R. 1-12 at Exh. K, 729-32, 746, 753-55.)
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In response, ASCU sued to enjoin Wolf Mountain from terminating the Ground
Lease. (R. 1-34.) ASCU then amended its complaint to allege numerous claims under
the Ground Lease and SPA Agreement. (R. 223-60.) Wolf Mountain moved to dismiss
or sever the new claims filed in ASCU's Complaint, which the trial court denied. (R.
392-423, 525-26.)
In addition, Wolf Mountain filed a counterclaim against ASCU and others under
the Ground Lease and SPA Agreement. (R. 711-770.) Wolf Mountain did not allege
arbitration as an affirmative defense. (R. 711-817). Wolf Mountain also filed a separate
suit containing the same claims. Those two matters and other related cases were
consolidated into this current case. (R. 577-78, 1595-99.)
Many of the claims ASCU alleges against Wolf Mountain arise out of the SPA
Agreement, including:
a. That Wolf Mountain breached contract and the implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing by
i. "failing to convey the required portions of its land for the golf course
development project," a requirement of the SPA Agreement (R. 246,
248);
ii. refusing to permit the golf course transaction to close as scheduled
on April 21, 2006 ,or at any time thereafter (R. 246, 248); and
iii. "failing to consent to and execute necessary documents to facilitate
the development of the specially planned area," the subject of the
SPA Agreement (R. 246, 248);
b. That Wolf Mountain intentionally interfered with ASCU's prospective
economic relations under rights ASCU obtained "pursuant to . . . the SPAAgreement" (R. 249-50);
c. That "A dispute exists between the parties regarding their respective
obligations under . . . the SPA Agreement for development of a golf
course," seeking declaratory judgment thereon (R. 251-52); and
d. That "ASCU is entitled to a decree of specific performance requiring Wolf
to convey the requested portions of its land for the golf development
project" (R. 253-54).
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Many of Wolf Mountain's counterclaims against ASCU also arise out of the SPA
Agreement, including that:
a. ASCU breached contract and the implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing by failing to fulfill its development obligations under the . . . SPA
Agreement. . . including, but not limited to . . . Frostwood [and the] Golf
course" (R. 759,761);
b. ASCU committed trespass to chattels and/or conversion by its acts relative
to the SPA Agreement and golf course development (R. 764); and
c. ASCU committed a prima facie tort by its acts relative to the SPA
Agreement and golf course development (R. 765).
ASCU's claims and Wolf Mountain's counterclaims set forth above are referred to herein
as the "SPA Agreement Claims."
ASCU and Wolf Mountain allege a number of claims against each other that do
not arise out of the SPA Agreement, including: (1) six different breaches of the Ground
Lease and the inherent covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and declaratory judgment
by ASCU against Wolf Mountain; and (2) seven different breaches of the Ground Lease
and the inherent covenant of good faith and fair dealing, fraud, negligent
misrepresentation, intentional interference, trespass to chattels/conversion, prima facie
tort, quiet title, and indemnification claims by Wolf Mountain against ASCU (all
collectively, the "Remaining Claims") (R. 757-69).
The parties halted the litigation of this case for months at a time on three different
occasions. "In February 2007, an agreed-to standstill was put in place to allow the parties
to attempt to consummate sales of their interests to third parties." (R. 2346.) None of the
parties pursued this litigation for an additional period of several months while they were
engaged in another case that was moving forward on an expedited schedule. (R. 2346.)
In addition, after the parties began to actively pursue this case again, in November 2008,
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they agreed to the appointment of a Special Master to resolve their discovery disputes,
but the appointment of the Special Master itself consumed approximately three more
months. (R. 2108-09, 2276-81, 3422-23.)
Section 5.8.1 of the SPA Agreement requires arbitration of certain disputes that
arise thereunder. (R. 3343-51 at Exh. A, p.60-61.) That clause states:
5.8.1 Binding Arbitration. In the event that the default mechanism contained herein shall
not sufficiently resolve a dispute under this Amended Agreement, then every such
continuing dispute, difference, and disagreement shall be referred to a single arbitrator
agreed upon by the parties . . . .
(R. 3343-51 at Exh. A, p.60-61.)
However, prior to April 29, 2009, Wolf Mountain believed and asserted to the trial
court that the SPA Agreement's arbitration provision did not apply to claims asserted by
any party other than Summit County, and therefore did not apply to the claims that are
the subject of this litigation. On April 24, 2009, Wolf Mountain argued at the trial court
that the arbitration provision does not apply because Summit County had not declared a
default per the terms of that provision:
The arbitration provision, Section 5.8.1 provides for binding arbitration but
only in the event the default mechanism contained therein shall not
sufficiently resolve the dispute under this amended agreement. It doesn't
say .. . that all disputes arising under this agreement must be submitted to
binding arbitration. It doesn't say that. All it says is that in the event that
the default mechanism doesn't work and it doesn't get it resolved . . . then
you go to arbitration. Well, there hasn't been any default declared by the
county against these third parties so that provision just doesn't apply. It in
no way preempts. There's not a requirement that Wolf Mountain has to go
to arbitration to resolve any disputes under the SPA Development
Agreement.
(R. 3164 (66:11-69:4).)
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Summit County has also asserted in a recent opinion that it alone had the right to
demand arbitration under the SPA Agreement with a defaulting party. (R. 4541 at Exh. A
at 7 flf 20)). The County explained: "§ 5.8.1 discusses the right of the County and a
defaulting party to pursue Binding Arbitration, where default mechanisms under the
Amended Agreement, which would include equitable remedies (rescission and specific
performance), do not resolve a dispute." (Id.) (emphasis added). The County then
declared: "Binding arbitration is not and shall not be invoked under § 5.8.1 and the
County shall not terminate the entire [SPA Agreement] at this time." (R. 4541 at Exh. A
at 37 (f 16)) (emphasis added).
On March 12, 2009, prior to the deadline to file motions to add parties, Wolf
Mountain filed a Motion for Leave to Amend to add nine additional Third Parties as
parties to this case, so that all affected parties would be in one forum and bound by the
same rulings with respect to the SPA Agreement. (R. 2490-91, 2019.)
On April 29, 2009, the trial court denied Wolf Mountain's Motion to add other
parties, concluding that the SPA Agreement "require[s] arbitration" and that "any
claim by Wolf that the SPA agreement was violated in some way is subject to the
mandatory arbitration provision in that agreement." (R. 3082) (emphasis added). In
a subsequent Order, the trial court confirmed this holding: "In its April 29, 2009 Ruling,
this Court acknowledged that disputes, differences or disagreements arising under the
SPA Agreement are subject to arbitration, pursuant to § 5.8.1 of the SPA Agreement."
(R. 4026.)
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In accordance with the district court's April 29, 2009 Ruling, and to bring all
related parties into the same forum,1 on May 15, 2009, Wolf Mountain filed a Demand
for Arbitration. (R. 3477-86.) The Demand included not only ASCU, but nine additional
Third Parties as well. (Id.) In addition, Wolf Mountain filed a Motion to Compel
Arbitration. (R. 3339-42.)
As of the date of this filing, fact discovery has not been completed in this case.
(See Docket). Prior to the date that Wolf Mountain filed its Motion to Compel
Arbitration, no expert reports had been provided, no expert discovery had been taken, and
no motions for summary judgment had been filed. (R. 2013-2028; Docket in trial court.)
However, the parties had taken a number of depositions, subpoenaed third parties, and
served written interrogatories upon one another. (See Record Index.)
On June 26, 2009, the district court issued a Ruling and Order denying Wolf
Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration (the "Ruling and Order"). (R. 4005-36.) In its
Ruling and Order, the trial court stated:
[Mjany claims in this case relate to . . . the SPA Agreement.... At a
minimum, the claims at issue in this case are collateral to the SPA
Agreement by implicating the parties' rights and obligations under the SPA
Agreement. Thus, the issues in dispute in this case may very well be
arbitrable under the broad arbitration provision of the SPA Agreement
1

See also October 12, 2009 Status Conference with Special Master 34:21-35:11 (R.
pending supplemental record index - not yet numbered) ("That meant that the only forum
that we had to get everybody in having a stake in the claims being asserted under the spa
agreement, to avoid multiple different suits by same parties on the same issue with
potential inconsistent results, was to go the arbitration route. And so after he made the
ruling that he did . . . that those claims were governed by the arbitration clause, we filed
the motion to compel arbitration. So that was the incentive behind it was to get everybody
having a stake in the claims in one forum so they'd all be bound by whatever the result
was. So that was the motivation for doing that. We didn't have the same opportunity to
do that under the ground lease because it doesn't have an arbitration clause.").
15

because of the agreement's relation to the parties' claims regarding the golf
course development project and specially planned area.
(R. 4027-28.)
However, citing Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356 (Utah
1992), the trial court ruled that Wolf Mountain had waived its right to seek arbitration
under the SPA Agreement because it had substantially participated in litigation:
Regardless of Wolf s awareness, a waiver of the right to arbitration may be
inferred by the parties' actions which demonstrate substantial participation
in litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate. The ASC
Parties contend that instead of immediately moving to compel arbitration,
Wolf filed a motion to dismiss, and after that was denied, filed its own
separate suit, answer and counterclaim. Wolf also failed to raise the right to
arbitration as an affirmative defense. Wolf has extensively litigated this
case over the past three years. A brief review of the docket for these
consolidated cases shows that Wolf has taken actions inconsistent with an
intent to arbitrate by conducting discovery for about three years, taking and
defending numerous depositions, and extensive motion practice, similar to
what occurred in Smile Inc. Asia. The case now as of this date consumes
37 volumes, growing daily. Unlike what occurred in Central Florida
Investments, Wolf has failed to ensure that the court and parties involved
were aware of its intent to seek arbitration. Therefore, Wolfs actions during
the past three years regarding these consolidated cases have demonstrated
its willingness to engage in litigation to a point inconsistent with an intent
to arbitrate.
(R. 4030-31). In addition, the Court ruled that prejudice would result to ASCU if
arbitration were permitted:
Hence, when looking at the extent of discovery and motion practice that has
occurred over the past three years and the expense of this litigation to the
parties at this point, the court finds and concludes that the ASC Parties have
been prejudiced by Wolfs late assertion of its right to arbitrate under the
SPA Agreement.
(R. 4033.) The trial court ruled on Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration
without an evidentiary hearing or even oral argument. (R. 4007.)
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On July 1, 2009, Wolf Mountain filed its Notice of Appeal herein, appealing the
trial court's Ruling and Order denying the Motion to Compel Arbitration. (See Docket in
this appeal). On July 8, 2009, Wolf Mountain filed a Motion to Stay the SPA Agreement
Claims in the trial court. (R. 4244-62.) However, the trial court denied that Motion too.
(R. 4546-66.)
On August 27, 2009, Wolf Mountain filed a Motion in this Court to Stay the SPA
Agreement Claims pending this Court's decision on appeal, which this Court granted.
(See Docket in this appeal). No party has sought a stay of the Remaining Claims. Trial is
presently scheduled to begin in this case on April 13, 2010. (R. 4423.)
On October 12, 2009, the Special Master assigned to this case, Scott Daniels,
conducted a status conference call with the parties regarding discovery in the case (the
"Status Conference"). (R. pending supplemental index. ) During the Status Conference,
Wolf Mountain's counsel pointed out that it did not know the evidence or measure of
ASCU's damages for the Remaining Claims because ASCU had failed to properly
respond to Wolf Mountain's interrogatories:
"I guess we have an issue understanding what damages ASCU claims
relate to the remaining claims. We have an expert report that appears to
be geared around the spa claims, you know, the failure-to-develop kinds of
claims, and, you know, we have that available to us. We had sent out an
interrogatory asking specifically about the damages resulting from the
various types of claims, which would have included the, you know, the
nonstayed claims. And really the only answer we got to that was, well,
you look at the documents we've produced and the depositions that have
taken p l a c e . . . .

This document was filed after the initially record index was ordered by this Court, and
thus there is not yet a record citation for this document.
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"We don't know exactly what they're claiming. If they're still claiming,
for example, any kind of damage resulting from inability to develop, then
everything that we have in the course of discovery would still be related to
the nonstayed claims. If they're talking about something narrower, then it
could be that there are parts of the discovery that are not related to those
claims, which, then, I guess, we could discuss whether those are part of the
stay. . . .[T]o have a very intelligent discussion of any of those items
requires some kind of explanation from ASCU as to what their damage
claim is with respect to the nonstayed claims."
"But, you know, until we get an answer to our interrogatories, we don't
know what that is. We don't know what the scope of it is."
(R. pending at 4:25-6:14, 19:13-16 (emphases added); see also id. at 4:9-12, 8:19-24,
18:1-5.)
In response, ASCU's counsel asserted that all of its evidence of damages related to
both the SPA Agreement Claims and the Remaining Claims:
"Our damage claims are because they interfered with our ability and
right to develop the property, whether those do or don't relate to the
spa. . . . separating damages into a bucket that are related to the spa and a
set that are not is, first of all, unworkable, and, second, I don't think
anything we're required to do."
"Well, and we are seeking [for the nonspa claims] everything that's in our
expert report.... I said we are seeking the full extent of our claims in our report

(R. pending at 9:12-15, 18-21; 21:6-7, 12-13 (emphasis added).)
Accordingly, Wolf Mountain's counsel asserted that if ASCU's counsel's
statements were true, and all of the discovery related to both stayed and Remaining
Claims, it needed to obtain such discovery for trial:
"I think as long as you're asserting a nonstayed claim, and there's
questions that are relevant to that, the fact that they're relevant also to
a stayed claim doesn't make them nondiscoverable."
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"I understand John [Lund, ASCU's counsel,] to be saying now that all of the
damages relate, in his mind, to ground-lease claims, maybe not uniquely
ground-lease claims but at least ground-lease claims that he would say are not
stayed at this point, and, therefore, I would guess any document that we have
. • • we could ask a question about [because it] would relate to those claims."
(R.pending at 21:22-25; 22:19-25; see also id. at 25:10-20, 26:16-20 (emphasis added).)
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The Utah Arbitration Act mandates that the "court, upon motion of any party
showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate."
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4(l) (1999) (emphasis added). There is no dispute that the
parties' SPA Agreement contains an arbitration agreement among Wolf Mountain,
ASCU, and several Third Parties. Wolf Mountain filed a Motion to Compel Arbitration
of the parties' disputes under the SPA Agreement. Accordingly, the trial court should
have ordered arbitration.
Instead, the trial court denied Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration,
ruling that Wolf Mountain had "waived" the SPA Agreement's arbitration provision
pursuant to this Court's standard in Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d
356 (Utah 1992) through (1) "substantially participating in the underlying litigation to a
point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate" (2) "resulting in prejudice to" the opposing
party, ASCU. Id. at 360.
However, Wolf Mountain did not "intentionally relinquish a known right" to
arbitration under the SPA Agreement, per the definition of "waiver." Soter's, Inc. v.
Deseret Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass 'n, 857 P.2d 935, 939-40 (Utah 1993). In fact, both Wolf
Mountain and Summit County expressly stated on the record their understanding and
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belief that only Summit County had the right to seek arbitration under the SPA
Agreement. (R. 3164 (66:11-69:4), 4541 atExh. A at 37 fl[ 16).) Instead, Wolf
Mountain had timely moved to add the Third Parties to this litigation, to ensure that all
affected persons were in one forum and avoid inconsistent outcomes or "redoing" of
proceedings. The trial court denied this motion, holding that the SPA Agreement
required arbitration with the Third Parties. The trial court's statements in that ruling is
what prompted Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration - which the trial court
also denied. Because Wolf Mountain's intention was express, the trial court did not have
to infer Wolf Mountain's intentions under Chandler.
Nevertheless, even under Chandler and its progeny, Wolf Mountain did not
"clearly manifestf] an intent to waive its right to arbitration." Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004
UT 58, ]j 16. Its participation in litigation has primarily consisted of fact discovery and
related pretrial motions, which even to date have not been completed. "If participation in
discovery and pretrial motions, standing alone, irrespective of the parties' intentions,
were to constitute waiver of the right to arbitrate, the strong policy favoring arbitration
would be damaged." Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3, \ 33.
Moreover, ASCU is not prejudiced by the conduct of fact discovery to date in this
case because it admits that such discovery pertains both to arbitrable and nonarbitrable
claims. "[N]o prejudice results if the discovery relates to nonarbitrable claims which will
be severed and separately litigated." Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359 n.17. In sum, ASCU
does not meet its "heavy burden" of overcoming this Court's "strong presumption against
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waiver" of arbitration, which is highly favored and supported by strong public policy
interests. Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58, ^ 14.
Finally, even if Wolf Mountain's actions did meet the Soter and Chandler tests for
waiver - which they do not - waiver of arbitration under Section 78-3 la-4 of the Utah
Arbitration Act violates the Utah Constitution. The Constitution grants all powers of
government to the Legislature that have not been otherwise allocated, whereas the
jurisdiction of district courts is "limited by this constitution or by statute." UTAH CONST,
art. VIII, § 5; see also art. VI, § 1. The district court may not constitutionally "exercise...
powers properly belonging to" the "Legislative" department. UTAH CONST, art. V, § 1.
When a statute is mandatory, it is jurisdictional, and the district court cannot apply the
equitable doctrine of waiver to avoid its mandate.
Section 78-3 la-4 of the Utah Arbitration Act states in mandatory terms: "The
court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of an arbitration agreement, shall
order the parties to arbitrate." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4 (1999). By its plain
language, arbitration "shall" be ordered, and ordering arbitration is "the essence o f the
statutory scheme. Id. Arbitration "may not be" denied, even if the trial court determines
that "issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault or grounds for the claim have
not been shown." Id. The trial court lacked jurisdiction to hold otherwise.
Finally, "waiver do[es] not in general apply to transactions that are forbidden by
statute or are contrary to public policy." Am. Sur. Co. of New York v. Gold, 375 F.2d
523, 528 (10th Cir. 1966). Arbitration is mandated by statute and supported by important
public policy.
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Therefore, this Court should reverse the trial court's ruling that Wolf Mountain
waived arbitration under § 78-3 la-4 (1999) and remand this case to the trial court for
further proceedings consistent with that ruling.
ARGUMENT
I.

WOLF MOUNTAIN DID NOT WAIVE ITS RIGHT TO ARBITRATE
CLAIMS UNDER THE SPA AGREEMENT.
A.

This Court Maintains a "Strong Presumption Against Waiver of
the Right to Arbitrate/9

Arbitration is not only highly favored in Utah, it is also backed by strong
public policy and numerous practical benefits. This Court "has recognized the
important public policy behind enforcing arbitration agreements as an 'approved,
practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court
congestion.'" Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58, ^ 14, 96 P.3d 911 (quoting
Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 833 P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992));
Buzas Baseball Inc. v. Salt Lake Trappers, Inc., 925 P.2d 941, 946 (Utah 1996)
("We begin by noting that the Utah Arbitration Act 'reflects long-standing public
policy favoring speedy and inexpensive methods of adjudicating disputes.'"
(quoting Allredv. Educators Mut. Ins. Ass'n, 909 P.2d 1263, 1265 (Utah 1996)).
In addition, this Court has repeatedly held that "[i]n light of this policy,
there is a strong presumption against waiver of the right to arbitrate." Cedar
Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58, *h 14 (quoting Cent. Fla. Invs.f 2002 UT 3, If 24);
accord Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32, H 12, 114 P.3d 580 ("We have recognized
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that arbitration has much to recommend i t . . . and have accordingly noted 4a
strong presumption against waiver of the right to arbitrate'") (citation omitted).
Accordingly, this Court has held that the party claiming waiver of the right
to arbitration bears a "heavy burden" to prove that such has occurred. Cent. Fla.
Invs., 2002 UT 3, ^f 24 (citing Tenneco Resins, Inc. v. Davy Int'l, AG, 770 F.2d
416, 420 (5th Cir. 1985) ("The burden on one seeking to prove a waiver of
arbitration is a heavy one")).
In this case, ASCU has not met, and cannot meet, its "heavy burden" of
proving that Wolf Mountain has waived arbitration under the SPA Agreement.
B.

Wolf Mountain Did Not "Intentionally Relinquish a Known
Right" to Arbitration.

It is axiomatic that waiver is the "intentional relinquishment of a known
right." Soter's, Inc. v. DeseretFed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 857 P.2d935, 939-40
(Utah 1993). This Court has applied the same standard to waiver of arbitration
rights: "Consistent with our general waiver jurisprudence, we have held that a
'waiver of the right to arbitrate must be intentional/ and a court may infer waiver
'only if the facts demonstrate that the party seeking to enforce arbitration intended
to disregard its right to arbitrate/" Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58 at f 14
(emphasis added) (citation omitted) (quoting Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 at ^ 24);
accord McCoy v. Blue Cross and Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31, ^f 20, 20 P.3d
901 (same). Accordingly, this Court will "infer the original intent of the party
asking for arbitration on a case-by-case basis." Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 at ^f 23
(citing Chandler, 833 P.2d at 358 n.8).
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1.

Wolf Mountain Did Not Believe That it Had an
Arbitration Right

In this case, Wolf Mountain's "intent" need not be inferred, since it
expressly stated its intent on the record before the trial court. From the outset of
the litigation, Wolf Mountain directly manifested its intent and good faith belief
that it did not have the right to pursue arbitration under the SPA Agreement.
Specifically, Wolf Mountain asserted that the SPA Agreement's arbitration
provision does not apply to the current litigation because Summit County has not
declared a default and sought arbitration per the terms of that provision. (R. 3164
(66:11-69:4)). In a hearing before the trial court regarding its Motion for Leave to
Amend to add the Third Parties, Wolf Mountain's counsel reiterated this long-held
position, stating:
The arbitration provision, Section 5.8.1 provides for binding arbitration but
only in the event the default mechanism contained therein shall not
sufficiently resolve the dispute under this amended agreement. It doesn't
say . . . that all disputes arising under this agreement must be submitted to
binding arbitration. It doesn't say that. All it says is that in the event that
the default mechanism doesn't work and it doesn't get it resolved . . . then
you go to arbitration. Well, there hasn't been any default declared by the
county against these third parties so that provision just doesn't apply. It in
no way preempts. There's not a requirement that Wolf Mountain has to go
to arbitration to resolve any disputes under the SPA Development
Agreement.
(R. 3164 (66:11-69:4).) There is no dispute that this statement reflected Wolf
Mountain's position from the outset of the litigation.
In addition, Wolf Mountain is not alone is asserting this position. For
example, on July 30, 2009 - months after the trial court determined that Wolf
Mountain was required to demand arbitration from the Third Parties - Summit
24

County came to the same conclusion. In its "Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law Regarding the Enforcement and Status o f the SPA Agreement, the County
stated that under Section 5.8.1 of the SPA Agreement, it alone had the right to
demand arbitration under the SPA Agreement with a defaulting party. (R. 4541 at
Exh. A at 7 (1f 20). The County explained: "§ 5.8.1 discusses the right of the
County and a defaulting party to pursue Binding Arbitration, where default
mechanisms under the Amended Agreement, which would include equitable
remedies (rescission and specific performance), do not resolve a dispute." (Id.)
(emphasis added). However, the County then declared: "Binding arbitration is
not and shall not be invoked under § 5.8.1 and the County shall not terminate the
entire [SPA Agreement] at this time." (R. 4541 at Exh. A at 37 fl| 16) (emphasis
added).)
2.

Only the Trial Court's April 29, 2009 Ruling Caused Wolf
Mountain to Change its Position.

On March 12, 2009, Wolf Mountain filed its Motion for Leave to Amend to add
the Third Parties to the litigation prior to the deadline established under the case
management order. (R. 2490-91, 2019.) More importantly, Wolf Mountain filed that
Motion to ensure that all affected SPA Agreement parties were brought together into one
forum, so that all would be bound by the same rulings with respect to the SPA
Agreement and no one would suffer from inconsistent rulings or lack of participation in
the resolution. (R. 2490-91, 2019; fn.l, supra) See, e.g., UTAH R. Civ. P. 19(a)
(joinder is mandatory for persons whose absence may "leave any of the persons already
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parties subject to a substantial risk of incurring double, multiple, or otherwise
inconsistent obligations").
However, on April 29, 2009, the trial court rejected Wolf Mountain's arguments
that the Third Parties must be added to this case to resolve Wolf Mountain's disputes
with them under the SPA Agreement. (R. 3065-87.) In so doing, the trial court
determined that "the SPA Agreement does require arbitration." (R. 3082.) The trial
court added: "Thus, any claim by Wolf that the SPA Agreement was violated in some
way is subject to the mandatory arbitration provision in that agreement." Id.
3.

Wolf Mountain Now Understands that the SPA
Agreement Provides Arbitration.

As directed by the trial court, Wolf Mountain now understands that the SPA
Agreement's arbitration clause provides for arbitration of disputes arising thereunder.
That clause states:
5.8.1 Binding Arbitration. In the event that the default mechanism
contained herein shall not sufficiently resolve a dispute under this Amended
Agreement, then every such continuing dispute, difference, and
disagreement shall be referred to a single arbitrator agreed upon by the
parties . . . .
(R. 3343-51 at Exh. A, p.60-61.) The "default mechanism" referred to in this clause is
Section 5.1.2 et. seq. of the SPA Agreement, in which Summit County is authorized to
give written notice to any other party to the Agreement of a default that such party has
committed thereunder. (R. 3343-51 at Exh. A, p.57-59.) Reference to this "default
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mechanism" is what induced Wolf Mountain, Summit County, and others generally to
believe that only Summit County could induce arbitration.3
However, that "default mechanism" ultimately does not control the dispute
resolution in this case. In their arbitration clause, the parties explicitly agreed to
arbitrate any "dispute under this Amended Agreement" - not just disputes invoking the
default mechanism. (R. 3343-51 at Exh. A, p.60-61.) If a "dispute under" the SPA
Agreement arises, then "such dispute "shall be referred to" arbitration. (Id.) All
disputes under the Agreement invoke arbitration unless they are resolved by the default
mechanism.
The SPA Agreement Claims have not been resolved by the default mechanism. In
addition, the default mechanism regards County-assigned defaults only, not disputes
among other parties. (Id.) Accordingly, the SPA Agreement Claims fall under the SPA
Agreement's arbitration clause and should be arbitrated.
Importantly, if there is any question whether the parties have agreed to arbitrate a
particular dispute, this Court construes arbitration clauses in favor of arbitration:
Moreover, if there is any question as to whether the parties agreed to
resolve their disputes through arbitration or litigation, i.e., through the filing
of a complaint and recording of a lis pendens, we interpret the agreement
keeping in mind our policy of encouraging arbitration. "It is the policy of
the law in Utah to interpret contracts in favor of arbitration, 'in keeping
with our policy of encouraging extrajudicial resolution of disputes when the
parties have agreed not to litigate.'"

Notably, in its recent filings on Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration, ASCU
has not taken any position regarding who has the right to seek arbitration under this
clause.
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Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 at \ 16 (quoting Reed v. Davis County Sch. DisL, 892 P.2d
1063, 1065 (Utah Ct.App.1995) (quoting Docutel Olivetti Corp. v. Dick Brady Sys., Inc.,
731 P.2d 475, 479 (Utah 1986)) and citing McCoy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 2001 UT
31, \ 14, 20 P.3d 901 ("It is our policy to interpret arbitration clauses in a manner that
favors arbitration." (quoting Docutel Olivetti, 731 P.2d at 479)); Chandler, 833 P.2d at
358 (stating "this court has also recognized the strong public policy in favor of
arbitration 'as an approved, practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and
easing court congestion.'").
4.

Wolf Mountain Promptly Sought Arbitration,

To adhere to the trial court's Ruling and bring all affected parties into one forum,
Wolf Mountain has sought to arbitrate the SPA Agreement claims. Only 16 days after
the trial court's determination that SPA Agreement Claims must be arbitrated, Wolf
Mountain filed its Demand for Arbitration in the American Arbitration Association,
followed by a Motion to Compel Arbitration in the trial court. (R. 3477-86, 3339-42.)
The trial court denied Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration. (R. 400536.) It did so on the sole ground that Wolf Mountain had waived its right to arbitration.
(R. 4030-31.) Thus, Wolf Mountain is ostensibly left with neither litigation nor
arbitration as a forum in which to resolve SPA Agreement disputes with all parties.
However, Wolf Mountain's prior position against any right to arbitrate, as set forth
above and corroborated by Summit County, did not constitute an "intentional
relinquishment of a known right" to arbitration. Soter's, 857 P.2d at 939-40.
Considering Wolf Mountain's prior position regarding arbitration, reversed only by the
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trial court's recent ruling asserting that arbitration was the only forum that would include
all SPA Agreement parties, as well as Utah courts' strong presumption against finding
that a party waived its right to arbitration, this Court should hold that Wolf Mountain has
not waived its right to arbitration in this case.
C.

Wolf Mountain Did Not "Substantially Participate in Litigation"
Sufficient to Waive Arbitration.

As set forth above, Wolf Mountain's intent regarding arbitration was explicit and
need not be inferred. However, even if this Court determined that such intent was not
explicit, ASCU does not prove that Wolf Mountain met both prongs of this Court's twopart test for inferring intent, as set forth in Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah,
833 P.2d 356 (Utah 1992). This Court has recently set forth this test as follows:
First, the party seeking arbitration must have substantially participated in
the underlying litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate. .
. . Second, the party's participation in the litigation must have resulted in
prejudice to the opposing party.
Baker, 2005 UT 32 at ^j 13 (citations and quotations omitted).
"The primary purpose of the first prong of Chandler's two-part waiver test is to
allow a court to evaluate whether the party asserting the right to arbitrate has clearly
manifested an intent to waive its right to arbitration." Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58 at
1f 16; see also Baker, 2005 UT 32 at ^j 13. However, as set forth above, Wolf Mountain
expressly stated its position that it did not have such a right. Notably, ASCU has never
disputed this position or asserted that Wolf Mountain did have the right to arbitration
under the SPA Agreement.
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Regarding Wolf Mountain's participation in litigation, it is true that, prior to filing
its Motion to Compel Arbitration, Wolf Mountain engaged in fact discovery and
discovery motions in this case. (See Docket.) However, much of that fact discovery was
necessitated by the demands of the case and to adhere to the Rules of Civil Procedure in
regards thereto. In addition, participation in discovery and pretrial motions does not
independently manifest an intent to waiver arbitration. In Central Florida Investments
("CFI"), CFI alleged that Parkwest Associates ("PWA") had waived its right to
arbitration by participating in pretrial discovery and motions. This Court disagreed:
PWA was, to a certain extent, compelled to file these pleadings to comply
with the rules of civil procedure. The Utah Rules of Civil Procedure
imposed requirements and deadlines on PWA to participate as it did in
pretrial discovery and in the filing of pretrial motions. If we were to hold
that PWA's participation in the litigation process, particularly
discovery, regardless of its intent regarding arbitration or the extent of
its participation in litigation, the result would be that in subsequent
cases parties would arguably always waive arbitration in complying
with deadlines imposed by the rules governing litigation in the courts.
Furthermore, we must factor in the strong policy of the law in Utah in favor
of arbitration, the strong presumption against waiver of the right to
arbitrate, and the burden of establishing substantial participation on the
party claiming waiver. If participation in discovery and pretrial
motions, standing alone, irrespective of the parties1 intentions, were to
constitute waiver of the right to arbitrate, the strong policy favoring
arbitration would be damaged.
Cent Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3 atffif32-33 (all emphases added).
Furthermore, prior to filing the Motion, no party had filed expert reports,
conducted expert discovery, served motions for summary judgment, or completed
other pretrial tasks. (See Docket.) Indeed, even fact discovery has not been
completed in this case, and the parties are preparing to receive thousands of
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additional documents and take multiple additional depositions. (R. 4585-4615,
4662-66, Rulings pending supp. record at 9/4/09 and 10/23/09.)
Accordingly, considering Wolf Mountain's expressly-stated position that it
did not have the right to arbitration, ASCU's acquiescence in that position, and
Summit County's corroboration, Wolf Mountain's participation in primarily fact
discovery was reasonable under the circumstances and does not give rise to an
inference of waiver. At the very least, it does not overcome the "strong
presumption against" waiver. Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58 at ^f 14.
D.

Wolf Mountain's Participation in Litigation Did Not Result in
Prejudice to ASCU.

Even if Wolf Mountain's "participation in litigation" did show an intent to
participate in litigation - which it does not - such is insufficient to overcome this
Court's "strong presumption against waiver." Cedar Surgery Ctr., 2004 UT 58 at
T| 14. That is because ASCU must also prove the second prong of the Chandler
test - that Wolf Mountain's "participation in the litigation must have resulted in
prejudice to" ASCU. Baker, 2005 UT 32 at \ 13.
Crucially, after setting forth the "prejudice" prong, this Court declared in
Chandler. "However, no prejudice results if the discovery relates to
nonarbitrable claims which will be severed and separately litigated."
Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359 n.17 (citing Rush v. Oppenheimer & Co., 779 F.2d 885,
889 (2d Cir. 1985)); Dickinson v. Heinold Sees., Inc., 661 F.2d 638, 642 (7th
Cir.1981)).
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In this case, ASCU's counsel has admitted that all fact discovery in this
case relates not only to the arbitrable SPA Agreement Claims, but also the
nonarbitrable claims in this case. (R. pending supp. at 10/12/09 Transcript at 9:1215, 18-21; 21:6-7, 12-13).
The SPA Agreement Claims are the subject of this appeal, and arbitration
of them has been stayed. {See WM Mem. in Supp. Motion to Stay at 5-7, Order
dated 09/30/09 granting Motion in this Appeal.) However, there are several other
Remaining Claims in this case that are now being separately litigated. {Id.; WM
Response to Emergency Petition in this Appeal.) In a recent Status Conference,
Wolf Mountain pointed out that it did not know the evidence or measure of
ASCU's damages for the Remaining Claims because ASCU had failed to properly
respond to Wolf Mountain's interrogatories. (R. pending supp. at 10/12/09
Transcript at 4:9-12, 4:25-6:14, 8:19-24, 18:1-5, and 19:13-16). In response,
ASCU's counsel asserted that all of its evidence of damages related to both the
SPA Agreement Claims and the Remaining Claims. {See id. at 9:12-15, 18-21;
21:6-7, 12-13). Specifically, ASCU's counsel stated:
"Our damage claims are because they interfered with our ability and
right to develop the property, whether those do or don't relate to the
spa. . . . separating damages into a bucket that are related to the spa and a
set that are not is, first of all, unworkable, and, second, I don't think
anything we're required to do."
"Well, and we are seeking [for the nonspa claims] everything that's in
our expert report.... I said we are seeking the full extent of our claims
in our report
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(Id.) (emphasis added). Accordingly, ASCU is not prejudiced by the fact
discovery conducted in this case because such "relates to nonarbitrable claims
which will be severed and separately litigated." Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359 n.17.
ASCU has recently confirmed this position in its "Emergency" Petition to
this Court. There, ASCU argued that "the completion of [fact] discovery will
impose no prejudice on any party since the evidence gathered could be used in
arbitration as well as litigation," and that "any discovery conducted can and will
be utilized in any future arbitration." (Emerg. Pet. at 3, 10) (emphasis added).
ASCU also agreed with the following statement from the Special Master:
the evidence relating to these [SPA Agreement] claims is so interwoven
with evidence relating to the other claims that it is impractical to require
witnesses and especially non-parties to separate documents into stayed and
non-stayed categories. Furthermore, the discovery needs to be done
whether the SPA Claims are tried or arbitrated.
(Emerg. Pet. at 11 (quoting the October 14, 2009 Report and Recommendation,
attached to the Petition as Exhibit "B")). Therefore, ASCU can scarcely claim that
it has been "prejudiced" by the conduct of discovery regarding the arbitrable
claims in this case. Its statements contradict such a claim.
Accordingly, ASCU is not prejudiced at all by the fact discovery that has
been conducted in this case because, by its own admission, that discovery pertains
to the nonarbitrable, Remaining Claims in this case. (See WM Mem. in Supp.
Motion to Stay at 5-7, Order dated 09/30/09 granting Motion in this Appeal.).4

In Chandler, this Court also identified cases in which pretrial fact discovery was
deemed insufficient to prejudice opposing parties to the point of requiring a waiver of
arbitration - even when discovery did not relate to nonarbitrable claims. See Chandler,
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II.

ARBITRATION IS A MANDATORY STATUTORY DIRECTIVE
THAT CANNOT BE WAIVED,
Even if this Court were to determine that Wolf Mountain had "intentionally

relinquished a known right" to arbitrate, applying the equitable doctrine of waiver to the
mandatory statute requiring arbitration, enacted by the Legislature under the Utah
Arbitration Act, unconstitutionally eviscerates the Legislature's exercise of legislative
power under the Act. Thus, this Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Wolf
Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration based on "waiver."
A.

Under Utah's Constitution, the Legislature Possesses AH
Governmental Powers Not Expressly Provided to Others.

Article VI, Section 1 of the Utah Constitution provides that the "Legislative power
of the State shall be vested in (a) . . . the Legislature of the State of Utah; and (b) the
people of the State of Utah." UTAH CONST, art. VI, § 1. This Court has further explained:
Our Legislature is directly representative of the people of the sovereign
state, and thus has inherently all of the powers of government except as
otherwise specified by the State Constitution. . . . having the residuum of
governmental power, [it] does not look to the State Constitution for the
grant of its powers, but that Constitution only sets forth the limitations on
its authority. Therefore, it can do any act or perform any function of
government not specifically prohibited by the State Constitution.

833 P.2d at 359 n. 17 (citing Sweater Bee by Banff v. Manhattan Indus., 754 F.2d 457,
464 (2d Cir. 1985) (no prejudice from discovery because discovery can be used in
arbitration and additional discovery can be ordered); Keating v. Sup. Court of Alameda
County, 645 P.2d 1192, 1206 (Cal. App. 1982) (no prejudice from discovery because
court ordered party seeking arbitration to cease discovery or extend equal discovery to
party claiming waiver). This Court has not yet determined whether participation in
discovery could ever independently justify a waiver. See Baker at ^f 16 n.4 ("There is
some disagreement as to whether participating in discovery rises to the level of prejudice
necessary to justify a waiver. We need not answer that question here . . . .") (citing
Chandler, 833 P.2d at 359 n.17).
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Wood v. Budge, 374 P.2d 516, 518 (Utah 1962) (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
This Court has recently reaffirmed the Legislature's preeminent constitutional status. See
Univ. of Utah v. Shurtleff 2006 UT 51, \ 18, 144 P.3d 1109 ("At the time of statehood,
the State of Utah 'committed its whole lawmaking power to the legislature, excepting
such as is expressly or impliedly withheld by the state or federal constitution.'" (quoting
Utah Sch. Bds. Ass'n v. Utah State Bd ofEduc, 2001 UT 2, ^ 11, 17 P.3d 1125) (citing
UTAH CONST, art. VI, § 1); see also Bateman v. Bd. of Exam 'rs, 322 P.2d 381, 385 (Utah
1958); Spence v. Utah State Agric. Coll, 225 P.2d 18, 23 (Utah 1956).
B.

Utah Courts' Jurisdiction is Limited by the Legislature's
Statutes and Utah's Constitution.

By contrast, the Utah Constitution vested specific, limited judicial powers in the
State's Supreme Court and district courts. Among them, the Supreme Court was granted
"appellate jurisdiction over all other matters to be exercised as provided by statute."
UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 3. However, the jurisdiction of the district courts was limited
by both the Constitution and any statute imposing limits on that jurisdiction: "The
district court shall have original jurisdiction in all matters except as limited by this
constitution or by statute

" UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 5 (emphasis added). In

addition, under the Constitution, Utah's Judicial department, including its district courts,
was constitutionally prohibited from exercising Legislative powers:
The powers of the government of the State of Utah shall be divided into
three distinct departments, the Legislative, the Executive, and the Judicial;
and no person charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging
to one of these departments, shall exercise any functions appertaining
to either of the others, except in the cases herein expressly directed or
permitted.
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UTAH CONST, art. V, § 1 (emphasis added); see also Kimball v. Grantsville City, 57 P. 1,
4 (Utah 1899) ("[N]o person or persons whose duty it is to exercise the functions of one
department can exercise any power belonging properly to either of the others, except in
cases expressly authorized by the constitution.").
Under this "separation of powers" doctrine, this Court has steadfastly refused to
ignore or substitute its own wisdom for the decisions of the Legislature. See, e.g.,
Gottling v. P.R. Inc., 2002 UT 95, | 23, 61 P.3d 989 ("This court cannot ignore or strike
down an act because it is either wise or unwise. The wisdom or lack of wisdom is for the
legislature to determine.") (citation and quotations omitted); Parkinson v. Watson, 291
P.2d 400, (Utah 1955) ("It is a rule of universal acceptance that the wisdom or
desirability of legislation is in no wise for the courts to consider.").
In addition, this Court has refused to interfere with legislative enactments based
solely on policy considerations. See, e.g., Baker v. Matheson, 607 P.2d 233, 237 (Utah
1979) ("[R]respect for the legislative prerogative in lawmaking requires that the judiciary
not interfere with or rewrite enactments of the Legislature where disagreement is founded
only on policy considerations and the legislative scheme employs reasonable means to
effectuate a legitimate objective.").
Furthermore, this Court has refused to "craft a remedy where the legislature
intends no remedy to exist." Gottling, 2002 UT 95, ^j 23. In fact, this Court has
reiterated that ill-advised or poor legislation, if otherwise constitutional, can be remedied
only by an appeal to the Legislature - not the courts. See, e.g., Parkinson, 291 P.2d at
403 ("Whether an act be ill advised or unfortunate if such it should be, does not give rise
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to an appeal from the legislature to the courts. But the remedy for correction of
legislation, remains with the people who elect successive legislatures.").
C.

Mandatory Statutory Rights are Jurisdictional.

Accordingly, in fulfilling their constitutionally limited duties, Utah courts do not
derogate from the requirements of mandatory statutes enacted by the Utah Legislature.
See Kennecott Copper Corp. v. Salt Lake County, 575 P.2d 705, 706 (Utah 1978). If a
district court finds that a statute is mandatory, then the court is left without further
discretion in applying the statute. See Swallow v. Kennard, 2008 UT App 134, ^|20 n.2,
183 P.3d 1052 (holding that when "a statute creates a mandatory condition," such
"eliminates] any discretion on the part of the courts" (quoting Diener v. Diener, 2004
UT App 314, If 12, 98 P.3d 1178) (internal quotations omitted))). District courts must
strictly comply with the terms of such statutes. See Aaron & Morey Bonds & Bail v.
Third Dist. Ct, 2007 UT 24, ^ 8, 156 P.3d 801 ("Strict compliance . . . is required when
failure to adhere to the statute 'will affect a substantive right of one of the parties and
possibly prejudice that party.'" (quotation omitted))); Parkside Salt Lake Corp. v. InsureRite, Inc., 2001 UT App 347, \ 22 n.6, 37 P.3d 1202 ("It is not the prerogative of courts .
. . to ignore legislative mandates.").
Furthermore, a "mandatory" designation renders the statute jurisdictional. Cache
County v. Prop. Tax Div. of the Utah State Tax Comm 'n, 922 P.2d 758, 764 (Utah 1996)
(citing Kennecott Copper, 575 P.2d at 706); Beaver County v. Utah State Tax Comm 'n,
919 P.2d 547, 552 (Utah 1996) (citing Kennecott Copper, 575 P.2d at 706). By contrast,
if a statute is merely "directory," then "substantial compliance" with its requirements is
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sufficient - so long as "no prejudice will occur as a result of failure to follow the
direction of the statute." Aaron & Morey Bonds & Bail, 2007 UT 24, ^| 7 (quoting Bd. of
Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d 1030, 1035 (Utah 1983)); accord Kennecott Copper,
575 P.2d at 706 (requiring strict compliance because of prejudice even though the
statutory language appeared directory).
In determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory, this Court has held that
"[t]here is no universal rule [of statutory construction] by which directory provisions
may, under all circumstances, be distinguished from those which are mandatory."
Kennecott Copper, 575 P.2d at 706; accord Aaron & Morey Bonds & Bail, 2007 UT 24,
H 7. Generally, "[a] designation is mandatory, and therefore jurisdictional, if it is 'of
the essence of the thing to be done.'" Beaver County, 919 P.2d at 552 (emphasis
added) (quoting Kennecott Copper, 575 P.2d at 706) (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)). By contrast, "a designation is merely directory, and therefore not
jurisdictional, if it is 'given with a view merely to the proper, orderly and prompt conduct
of. . . business, and by failure to obey no prejudice will occur to those whose rights are
protected by the statute.'" Id.; accord Stahlv. Utah Transit Auth., 618 P.2d 480, 481
(Utah 1980) ("[Generally a direction in a statute to do an act is considered 'mandatory'
when consequences are attached to the failure to act."). However, "the fundamental
consideration in interpreting statutes is legislative intent; and that is determined in light of
the purpose the statute was designed to achieve." Bd. of Educ. v. Salt Lake County, 659
P.2d at 1033; see also Kennecott Copper, 575 P.2d at 706.
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The first and paramount consideration in divining legislative intent is the plain
language of the statute, read as a whole with a view toward harmonizing its provisions.
See Aaron & Morey Bonds & Bail, 2007 UT 24, f 9. This often further requires an
examination of "the history and background of the statute, its purpose, and the
interpretation which will best implement that purpose." Moore v. Schwendiman, 750
P.2d 204, 206 (Utah Ct. App. 1988) (citations omitted)).
In evaluating the text of the statute, the court does not look beyond the plain
language unless it first finds ambiguity. See Parr v. Stubbs, 2005 UT App 310, ^j 6, 117
P.3d 1079 (citing Olsen v. Samuel Mclntyre Inv. Co., 956 P.2d 257, 259 (Utah 1998));
accordBrinkerhoffv. Forsyth, 779 P.2d 685, 686 (Utah 1989); State ex rel M.C v.
K.H.C, 940 P.2d 1229, 1236 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) ("it is well established that 'where the
language of a statute is clear and unambiguous,. . . [the court] may hold that the
construction intended by the legislature is obvious from the language used.'" (quoting 3
Norman J. Singer, Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57.03, at 7 (5th ed. 1992))).
Further, it is presumed that "the terms of a statute are used advisedly and should be given
an interpretation and application which is in accord with their usually accepted
meanings." Bd. ofEduc. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d at 1033 (citing Grant v. Utah
State Land Bd, 4S5 P.2d 1035 (1971)).
In addition, it is well-established that "'the form of the verb used in a statute, i.e.,
something may, shall, or must be done, is the single most important textual
consideration determining whether a statute is mandatory or directory.'" State ex rel
M.C, 940 P.2d at 1236 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 3 Norman J. Singer,
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Sutherland Statutory Construction § 57.03, at 7 (5th ed. 1992)) (emphasis added). For
example, the term "may" has been interpreted as permissive thereby giving the trial court
a measure of discretion. Crockett v. Crockett, 836 P.2d 818, 820 (Utah Ct. App. 1992).
But see Bd. ofEduc. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d at 1035. In contrast, "[w]hile 'shall'
has been validly interpreted as directory . . . , it is usually presumed mandatory and has
been interpreted as such previously in this and other jurisdictions." Bd. ofEduc. v. Salt
Lake County, 659 P.2d at 1035 (citing Herr v. Salt Lake County, 525 P.2d 728 (Utah
1974); State v. Zeimer, 347 P.2d 1111 (Utah 1960); Swift v. Smith, 201 P.2d 609 (Colo.
1948)).
For example, in Parr v. Stubbs, the Court of Appeals held that a lien statute
employing the word "shall" in connection with service of process requirements was
mandatory, and thus required strict compliance. See 2005 UT App 310,fflf5, 7. In Parr,
the statute at issue provided in pertinent part: "[t]he record interest holder shall serve a
copy of the petition on the lien claimant and a notice of the hearing pursuant to Rules of
Civil Procedure, Rule 4, Process." Id. at Tf 5 (emphasis added). In supporting its holding,
the Court of Appeals observed that the Legislature chose to use the common and
straightforward word "shall," which generally creates a mandatory condition. Id. at f 7.
Finding "no reason to deviate from this common understanding," the court construed the
statute to be mandatory. Id.
This Court reached a similar conclusion in Board of Education v. Salt Lake
County. See 659 P.2d at 1035. In that case, this Court held the following statutory
provisions mandatory:
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It is the duty of the county treasurer to pay to the treasurer of each ...,
school district..., on the first day of each month, all moneys in his hands
collected for and due such ... school [district] .... The county treasurer
shall pay to the treasurer of each ... school district... [its] proportionate
share of delinquent taxes, interest, penalty and costs on all tax sales and
redemptions therefrom, monthly, and shall make a final settlement... on
the last day of March of each year....
Such taxes shall be collected by the county officers as other taxes are
collected and the county treasurer shall pay the same to the treasurer of
said board within thirty days after it is collected, who shall hold the same
subject to the order of the board of education.
Id. (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 53-7-10, 59-10-66) (emphasis added). In reaching this
conclusion, this Court observed that the Treasurer's failure to strictly comply with the
statutory provisions would result in prejudice to those whose rights are protected by the
statutes. See id. at 1035. Further, this Court noted that "since 'shall', a word with a
usually accepted mandatory connotation, has been used throughout the statutory
provisions, the statutes in question must be interpreted strictly as they are plainly
written." Id. (emphasis added).
D.

Because Mandatory Statutes are Jurisdictional, They Cannot Be
Waived.

Because mandatory statutes are jurisdictional, they cannot be waived - even by the
parties themselves. See, e.g., Bowles v. Russell, 551 U.S. 205; Schachtv. United States,
398 U.S. 58 (1970); Whitfield v. Aetna Life Ins. Co., 205 U.S. 489 (1907).
For example, in Whitfield v. Aetna Life Insurance Company, 205 U.S. 489 (1907),
the U.S. Supreme Court considered a case in which Aetna Life Insurance Company and
its insured agreed to waive Aetna's coverage for death benefits if the insured committed
suicide. See id. at 489-90. However, Missouri statutes specifically forbade suicide
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exemptions in insurance policies except under certain circumstances that Aetna did not
meet. See id. at 494. The Court, citing similar cases, stated with approval the following
rule: "The legislative will, when expressed in the peremptory terms of this statute, is
paramount and absolute, and cannot be varied or waived by the private conventions
of the parties." Id. at 497 (emphasis added). The Court concluded: "[W]e cannot hold
that the present [waiver] stipulation can be enforced without violating the plain terms of a
mandatory statute which the parties have no power to alter or abrogate." Id. at 501.
Similarly, in Bowles, the U.S. Supreme Court affirmed the Circuit Court's
dismissal of Bowles's appeal due to his failure to timely file the appeal - even though he
made the filing within the time period provided by the district court. The Supreme Court
reiterated its "longstanding rule" that "the requirement of filing a timely notice of appeal
is 'mandatory and jurisdictional.'" Bowles, 551 U.S. at 209 (quoting Griggs v. Provident
Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 61 (1982)). It repeated that the requirement is
jurisdictional because the appeal period was one of the "limits enacted by Congress," and
the Court had "repeatedly held that this statute-based filing period for civil cases is
jurisdictional." Id. at 212. The Court elaborated:
Jurisdictional treatment of statutory time limits makes good sense. Within
constitutional bounds, Congress decides what cases the federal courts have
jurisdiction to consider. Because Congress decides whether federal courts
can hear cases at all, it can also determine when, and under what
conditions, federal courts can hear them.
Id. at 212-13. In response, Bowles argued that equitable exceptions should apply, since
the district court misinformed him of the time for appeal. See id. at 213. However, the
Court held that it "has no authority to create equitable exceptions to jurisdictional
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requirements," and that "because Bowles' error is one of jurisdictional magnitude, he
cannot rely on forfeiture or waiver to excuse his lack of compliance." Id. at 213-14.
By contrast, in Schacht v. United States, 398 U.S. 58 (1970), the U.S. Supreme
Court rejected the argument that the requirement for timely filing a petition for certiorari
was "jurisdictional and cannot be waived" because the requirement was based on one of
its own rules. Id. at 64. The Court emphasized that "it must be remembered that this rule
was not enacted by Congress." Id. Justice Harlan's concurring opinion pointed out that
the Supreme Court has "without exception treated the statutory time limitations as
jurisdictional." Id. at 65. The Court concluded:
As a matter of statutory interpretation, the Court has not presumed the right
to extend time limits specified in statutes where there is no indication of a
congressional purpose to authorize the Court to do so. Because we cannot
waive congressional enactments, the statutory time limits are treated as
jurisdictional.
Id. at 68 (emphasis added).
It is no coincidence that "mandatory" statutes are considered jurisdictional and
thus unwaivable. The Utah Constitution not only grants the Legislature constitutional
lawmaking authority, as set forth above; it also affirms that its own provisions are
"mandatory/' and thus cannot be derogated from unless expressly permitted: "The
provisions of this Constitution are mandatory and prohibitory, unless by express words
they are declared to be otherwise." UTAH CONST, art. 1, § 9, Sec. 26.5

5

Without elaborating the jurisdictional reasons therefor, this Court and the Utah Court of
Appeals have held that a number of specific mandatory statutes cannot be waived. See
Projects Unlimited, Inc. v. Copper State Thrift & Loan, 798 P.2d 738, 751 n.13 (Utah
1990) (noting that the lis pendens and notice requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 38-111(3) "serve[ ] as a substantive restriction on the lien action" against a defendant without
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E.

Arbitration Pursuant to Section 78-31a-4(a) is Mandatory and
Jurisdictional, and Thus Cannot Be Waived.

Like the statutes in Parr v. Stubbs and Board of Education, discussed above, the
arbitration compulsion provision of the Utah Arbitration Act (the "Act") is mandatory,
and therefore jurisdictional, and cannot be waived. Section 78-3 la-4 of the Act provides:
78-3 la-4 Court order to arbitrate.
(1) The court, upon motion of any party showing the existence of
an arbitration agreement, shall order the parties to arbitrate. If an
issue is raised concerning the existence of an arbitration agreement or the
scope of the matters covered by the agreement, the court shall determine
those issues and order or deny arbitration accordingly.
(2) If an issue subject to arbitration under the alleged arbitration
agreement is involved in an action or proceeding pending before a court
having jurisdiction to hear motions to compel arbitration, the motion shall
be made to that court Otherwise, the motion shall be made to a court
with proper venue.
(3) An order to submit an agreement to arbitration stays any action
or proceeding involving an issue subject to arbitration under the agreement.
However, if the issue is severable from the other issues in the action or
proceeding, only the issue subject to arbitration is stayed. If a motion is
made in an action or proceeding, the order for arbitration shall include a
stay of the action or proceeding.
(4) Refusal to issue an order to arbitrate may not be grounded
on a claim that an issue subject to arbitration lacks merit, or that fault
or grounds for the claim have not been shown.

notice "and, unlike a true statute of limitation, is not waived if not pleaded."); State v.
Fedder, 262 P.2d 753, 756 (Utah 1953) ("It is the majority view that a defendant cannot
waive his presence at the time of sentence under a statute such as this by voluntarily
absenting himself at the time set."); Victor Plastering, Inc. v. Swanson Bldg. Materials,
Inc., 2008 UT App 474, f 14, 200 P.3d 657 (holding that "section 38-1-1 l(3)'s lis
pendens and notice requirements . . . provide a non-waivable defense that cannot be
construed as a statute of limitations"); Hansen v. Wilkinson, 889 P.2d 927, 928 (Utah Ct.
App. 1995) (holding that the provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 64-13-23(4) "cannot be
waived, and the court is required to make the determination under the statute").
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UTAH CODE ANN.

§ 78-3 la-4 (1999)6 (emphasis added).

The foregoing statute is clearly mandatory, requiring strict compliance with its
terms. First, compelling arbitration under the terms of the statute is "of the essence o f
the statutory scheme. Beaver County, 919 P.2d at 552. By its own terms, the statute
governs any "court order to arbitrate." UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4 (1999). In addition,
the statute is not given with a view merely to the "proper, orderly, and prompt conduct of
business." Beaver County, 919 P.2d at 552. Rather, its purpose is to ensure that persons
showing an agreement to arbitrate are, in fact, granted a court order to arbitrate. It
affords courts no discretion in granting such an order. Compelling arbitration is the
precise function of this provision.
Further, the plain language of the statute contains no ambiguity. Specifically, the
term "shall" is used repeatedly throughout the provisions of the statute. As discussed
above, "shall" is commonly understood to create a mandatory condition. See Aaron &
Morey Bonds & Bail, 2007 UT 24, ^f 9. Presumably, this term was used advisedly. See
Bd, ofEduc. v. Salt Lake County, 659 P.2d at 1033. Furthermore, neither the statutory
language nor its associated history provides any reason to deviate from this common
understanding. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4 (1999). The statute includes the term
"may" in one circumstance under subsection four; however, the Legislature actually uses
that term to reinforce the mandatory nature of the Act, declaring that arbitration "may not
be" denied even if the trial court determines that the "issue subject to arbitration lacks
merit, or that fault or grounds for the claim have not been shown." Id. Accordingly, the
6

This version of the Act applies to the parties' SPA Agreement, which the parties
executed effective November 15, 1999.
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Legislature in no way vested the trial courts with discretion in determining the
appropriateness of arbitration, assuming an enforceable arbitration agreement is found.
In addition, substantial rights depend on compliance with the arbitration statute.
The right to arbitration is plainly a substantial right, one for which this Court has
repeatedly affirmed an "important policy interest." Cedar Surgery Center, 2004 UT 58, ^
14 (holding that this Court "has recognized the important public policy behind enforcing
arbitration agreements as an 'approved, practical, and inexpensive means of settling
disputes and easing court congestion'" (quoting Chandler v. Blue Cross Blue Shield, 833
P.2d 356, 358 (Utah 1992))). Failure to obey the terms of the statute would plainly
prejudice any party who contracted for arbitration - not litigation. See Buckner v.
Kennard, 2004 UT 78, \ 18, 99 P.3d 842 ("Arbitration is 'a matter of contract.'" (quoting
Cent Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3, ^ 10, 40 P.3d 599)); Pac. Dev., L.C v. Orton, 2001 UT 36, Tf
13, 23 P.3d 1035 ("The scope of the arbitration is a governing standard that is
fundamental to the expectations of the parties to the arbitration.").
In addition, the trial court cannot "substantially comply" with a statute that
compels a completely different system of dispute resolution - arbitration, instead of
litigation. Aaron & Morey Bonds & Bail, 2007 UT 24, \ 7. Accordingly, even a
"directory" statute's standard of "substantial compliance" with the abovementioned
statute would be inappropriate.
Viewing the mandatory nature of this statute, this Court has thus correctly held:
"Where the evidence relating to a purported agreement to arbitrate is undisputed, the
district court has no discretion under the statute. It must compel arbitration."
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McCoy v. Blue Cross Blue Shield of Utah, 2001 UT 31 \ 10, 20 P.3d 901 (emphasis
added) (citing Docutel Olivetti v. Dick Brady Sys. Inc., 731 P.2d 475, 479-80 (Utah 1986)
(construing contract to mandate arbitration of dispute)).
Because the Act's arbitration statute is mandatory and jurisdictional, it cannot be
waived. See, e.g., Bowles, 551 U.S. at 210-12; Schacht, 398 U.S. at 68; Whitfield, 205
U.S. at 489, 497-501. As the U.S. Supreme Court declared in Whitfield: "The legislative
will, when expressed in the peremptory terms of this statute, is paramount and
absolute, and cannot be varied or waived by the private conventions of the parties."
Whitfield, 205 U.S. at 497 (emphasis added). To hold otherwise would permit the trial
court to "exercise . . . powers properly belonging to" the "Legislative" department, in
violation of Article V of the Utah Constitution. UTAH CONST, art. V, § 1. To hold
otherwise would also violate Article VIII, Section 5's restriction on the trial court's
jurisdiction as "limited by this constitution or by statute." UTAH CONST, art. VIII, § 5. In
fact, the arbitration statute directly "limits the jurisdiction" of the trial court by rendering
arbitration mandatory. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4 (1999).
In sum, this Court should construe the above arbitration statute as mandatory and
jurisdictional, and therefore reverse the trial court's ruling denying arbitration.
F.

Arbitration is an Important Public Policy and Thus Cannot Be
Waived.

In addition, as the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals, U.S. Supreme Court, and other
Circuit Courts have held, "waiver do[es] not in general apply to transactions that are
forbidden by statute or are contrary to public policy." Am. Sur. Co. of New York v. Gold,
375 F.2d 523, 528 (10th Cir. 1966) (quoting Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. McNulty,
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307 F.2d 432, 443 (5th Cir. 1962); Jennings Water, Inc. v. North Vernon, 895 F.2d 311,
317 (7th Cir. 1989) (quoting Gold, 375 F.2d 523); see also United Cities Gas Co. v.
Brock Exploration Co., 995 F. Supp. 1284, (D. Kan. 1998) ("[T|he doctrines of waiver
and estoppel generally do not apply to transactions that are forbidden by statute or are
contrary to public policy."); Brooklyn Sav. Bank v. O'Neil, 324 U.S. 697, 706 (1945)
(holding that statutory entitlements guaranteed to employees by the Fair Labor Standards
Act of 1938 were unwaivable because the structure and legislative history of the Act
evinced a specific "legislative policy" of "preventing] private contracts" on such).
There is no dispute that arbitration is an important public policy interest. See, e.g.,
Cedar Surgery Center, 2004 UT 58, TJ 14 (holding that this Court "has recognized the
important public policy behind enforcing arbitration agreements as an 'approved,
practical, and inexpensive means of settling disputes and easing court congestion'"
(quoting Chandler, 833 P.2d at 358); Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3, ^ 24 ("In light of this
policy, we have also acknowledged that there is "a strong presumption against waiver of
the right to arbitrate.'"); see also Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32, | 12, 114 P.3d 580.
Accordingly, because arbitration presents an important public policy, Utah's
courts cannot apply the doctrine of waiver to halt its use and benefits.
G.

This Court Should Abrogate Chandler and its Progeny.

As set forth in Section I.C, supra, in Chandler, this Court "adopt[ed] the principle
that waiver o f arbitration could occur "based on both a finding of participation in
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate and a finding of prejudice."
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Chandler, 833 P.2d at 360. This Court and the Utah Court of Appeals have followed this
principle in six subsequent cases.
However, because the Act's arbitration requirement is mandatory and
jurisdictional, it cannot be waived, nor can Utah courts derogate from its provisions. As
this Court has previously held:
Simply put, we must not craft a remedy where the legislature intends no
remedy to exist. To do otherwise trespasses upon the legislative domain and
threatens the fragile balance of power upon which our system of
government rests.
Gottling, 2002 UT 95 at \ 23. The Legislature has not permitted the equitable remedy of
"waiver" to derogate from the mandatory arbitration requirement; in fact, it has mandated
that such arbitration "shall be" ordered. UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-3 la-4 (1999).
Consequently, this Court should abrogate the rulings in Chandler and its progeny.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should reverse the trial court's decision
denying Wolf Mountain's Motion to Compel Arbitration and remand this case to the trial
court for further proceedings consistent with that determination.
REQUEST FOR ORAL ARGUMENT
Wolf Mountain hereby requests oral argument because it will materially assist this
Court in resolving the issues in this case.

7

See Baker v. Stevens, 2005 UT 32, f 12, 114 P.3d 580; Cedar Surgery Center, 2004 UT
58, H 14, 96 P.3d 911; Cent. Fla. Invs., 2002 UT 3, U 24, 40 P.3d 599; Pledger v.
Gillespie, 1999 UT 54, ^ 19, 982 P.2d 572; Smile Inc. Asia Pte. Ltd. v. BriteSmile Mgmt.,
Inc., 2005 UT App 381, \ 22, 122 P.3d 654; Am. Rural Cellular, Inc. v. Sys. Commc'n
Corp., 939 P.2d 185, 192 (Utah Ct. App. 1997).
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DATED this 2nd day of November, 2009.

David M. Wahlquist
Rod N. Andreason
RyanB. Frazier
Attorneys for Appellant/Plaintiffs
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AMENDED AND RESTATED DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT
FOR THE CANYONS SPECIALLY PLANNED AREA
SNYDERVILLE BASIN, SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH
TfflS AMENDED AND RESTATED DEVELOPMENT AGREEMENT (the
"Amended Agreement") is entered into as of this f§** day of Kto$e*0ter > 1999, by and
among ASC Utah, Inc., d.b.a. The Canyons, American Skiing Company Resort Properties,
Inc. (collectively the "Master Developer"), the group of landowners that are listed as
Participating Owners and are signatories hereto (collectively the "Participating
Landowners"), and Summit County, a political subdivision of the State of Utah, by and
through its Board of County Commissioners ("the County").
RECITALS
A.
Master Developer and Participating Landowners (collectively the
"Developers") are the owners, legal representatives of the owners, or lessees under longterm leases of approximately 7768 acres of land and appurtenant real property rights located
in Summit County, Utah, the legal description and ownership maps of which are provided in
Ordinance 333-A (the "Property").
B.
On July 6, 1998, the County adopted and approved Ordinance 333, which
established an initial Specially Planned Area ("SPA") Zone District for a portion of the
Property. The initial SPA Plan for The Canyons SPA Zone District was implemented by
Ordinance 334, a Development Agreement among the County and various of the Developers
(the "Original Development Agreement").
C.
The Original Development Agreement contemplated the need to amend the
SPA Zone District and SPA Plan in the future to provide for its expansion and to create a
master planned resort community as depicted in The Canyons SPA Plan Book of Exhibits
attached hereto and incorporated herein.
D.
The County and the Developers desire to amend and restate the Original
Development Agreement to provide for the vesting of certain additional land use
designations, densities, development configurations, and development standards included in
The Canyons SPA Master Development Plan, as reflected on Exhibit B hereto.
1

E.
The County, through the adoption of this Amended and Restated Development
Agreement (the "Amended Agreement"), desires to establish The Canyons Resort and Resort
Community under the SPA provisions of the Snyderville Basin Development Code ("Code")
and the Snyderville Basin General Plan ("General Plan") for the purpose of implementing
development standards and processes that are consistent therewith. The Developers and the
County desire to clarify certain standards and procedures that will be applied to certain
additional approvals contemplated in connection with the development of The Resort and
Resort Community, as well as the construction of improvements that will benefit the
Property, and to establish certain standards for the phased development and construction of
the Resort Community and certain improvements, and to address requirements for certain
community facilities and amenities. The County also desires to receive certain public
benefits and amenities, and the Developers are willing to provide these public benefits and
amenities in consideration of the agreement of the County to provide increased densities and
intensity of uses in the Resort and Resort Community pursuant to the terms of this Amended
Agreement.
F.
This Amended Agreement amends and restates the Original Development
Agreement and specifically implements The Canyons SPA Zone District as established by
Ordinance 333-A in accordance with the General Plan and the Code.
G.
The County, acting pursuant to its authority under Utah Code Annotated Section
17-27-101 et seq., the Code, and the General Plan, has made certain determinations with
respect to The Canyons SPA Plan, and in the exercise of its legislative discretion has elected
to approve the use, density, and general configuration of The Canyons SPA Plan resulting in
the negotiation, preparation, consideration, and approval of this Amended Agreement after
all necessary public hearings.
FINDINGS
1.
Following lawfully advertised public hearings on May 18, May 24, and June 3,
1999, the Resort and Resort Community received a recommendation for approval through an
Amended Development Agreement by action of the Snyderville Basin Planning Commission
taken on June 15, 1999. The Board of County Commissioners held a lawfully advertised
public hearing on September 23, 1999, and during a lawfully advertised public meeting on
November 8, 1999, approved The Resort and Resort Community under the process and
procedures set forth in the Code and the General Plan. The terms and conditions of approval
are incorporated fully into this Amended Agreement. In making such approval, the Board of
County Commissioners made such findings of fact and conclusions of law as are required as
a condition of the approvals, as reflected in the staff recommendation adopted with any
modifications, as reflected in the minutes of the above-referenced public meetings, and as
reflected by the other enumerated findings herein.
2.

The Canyons SPA Plan involves phased plat and site plan applications, and has
2
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a cumulative proposed project size in excess of 100 acres.
3.
The Canyons SPA Plan, as reflected in and conditioned by the terms and
conditions of this Amended Agreement, is in conformity with the General Plan, any existing
capital improvements programs, the provisions of the Code, to include concurrency and
infrastructure requirements, and all other development requirements of Summit County.
4.
The Canyons SPA Plan includes a number of amenities which are located on
various Project Sites. The provision of these amenities, or the provision of land upon which
to construct these amenities, has been taken into consideration by Summit County in granting
increased residential and commercial densities on those Project Sites. This includes, among
other things, the reservation of land for Golf, Trail, and Buffer areas.
5.
The Canyons SPA Plan contains outstanding features that advance the policies,
goals, and objectives of the General Plan beyond mere conformity, including the following:
(i) agreements with respect to design controls and limitations to minimize the visual impact
of the development; (ii) the clustering and appropriate location of density; (iii) the creation of
a significant trail system and park area connections and improvements; and (iv) the provision
for specialized programs, facilities, and amenities to offset development impacts.
6.
There exists adequate provision for mitigation of all fiscal and service impacts
on the general public.
7.
The Canyons SPA Plan meets or exceeds development quality and aesthetic
objectives of the General Plan and the Code, is consistent with the goal of orderly growth in
the Snyderville Basin, and minimizes construction impacts on public infrastructure within the
Basin.
8.
County.

There will be no construction management impacts that are unacceptable to the

9.
The Developers have committed to comply with all appropriate Concurrency
and Infrastructure requirements of the Code, and all appropriate criteria and standards
described in this Amended Agreement, including all applicable impact fees to the County and
its Special Districts.
10.
The proposed development reasonably assures that life and property within the
Snyderville Basin is protected from any adverse impact of this development.
11.
The Developers shall take appropriate measures to prevent harm to neighboring
properties and lands from development, including nuisances.
12.
Throughout the period since the approval of the Original Development
Agreement, during which time the Master Developer has been preparing to amend the

3
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improvements required for the Project, including without limitation special assessments and
special taxes under state law, and may include capital and non-capital financing or both. The
County, at its sole discretion, may determine the conditions for the use of such financing,
including, but not limited to, petitions or applications of the Master Developer and/or the
RVMA, the making of deposits sufficient to cover any County out-of-pocket costs, the need
for and the conditions of any current appraisals required for any financing and any standards
relating to the marketing of any securities, such as lien-to-value ratios, taxable or taxexempts bonds and series, or other structural aspects of issues of securities. While the
County agrees to cooperate in the consideration of such financing, including the taking of
proceedings under appropriate authorities, the County does not guarantee that any securities
can or will be issued, sold, or delivered except as may be approved by the County with the
assistance and advice of the financial advisors, underwriters, consultants, and attorneys
retained by the County for such purposes.
Section 4.2 Cooperation between the County and the Developers. The County agrees to
reasonably cooperate with the Master Developer and any Participating Landowner in their
endeavors to obtain any other permits and approvals as may be required from other
governmental or quasi-governmental agencies having jurisdiction over Project Sites or
portions thereof.
Section 4.3 Employee Affordable Housing. In the event that sites outside of The Canyons
SPA, but within the jurisdiction of Summit County, are consistent with the General Plan and
are identified by the County for employee housing in accordance with the Developers'
obligations under this Amended Agreement and, if, after reasonable, good faith efforts by the
Developers, the Developers do not receive all necessary permits and approvals for any such
site so identified, the Developers shall not be relieved of the obligation to provide employee
housing that such site was intended to fulfill under this Amended Agreement, but shall be
allowed a reasonable delay in fulfilling such obligation under this Amended Agreement.
ARTICLE 5
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Section 5.1 Default.
5.1.1 Occurrence of Default. Default under this Amended Agreement occurs upon the
happening of one or more of the following events or conditions:
(a) A warranty or representation made or furnished to the County by a
Developer, the RVMA, or The Colony Master Association in this Amended
Agreement, including any attachments hereto, which is materially false or
proves to have been false in any material respect when it was made.
(b) A finding and determination made by the County following a Benchmark or
57

00553911

BK012?7 PG00461

Annual Review that upon the basis of substantial evidence, the Master
Developer, Developers, The Colony Master Association, or RVMA have not
complied in good faith with one or more of the material terms or conditions of
this Amended Agreement, including a failure to satisfy Benchmarks under
Section 3.3.
(c) Any other act or omission by the Developer(s) that materially interferes
with the intent and objective of this Amended Agreement.
5.1.2 Procedure Upon Default. Within ten (10) days after the occurrence of a default
hereunder, the County shall give the Defaulting Party (where "Defaulting Party" means
the party or parties alleged by the County under Section 5.1.1 as being in default) and
the Canyons Resort Village Management Association and/or The Colony Master
Association written notice specifying the nature of the alleged default and, when
appropriate, the manner in which the default must be satisfactorily cured. The
Defaulting Party shall have sixty (60) days after receipt of written notice to cure the
default. Failure or delay in giving notice of default shall not constitute a waiver of any
default, nor shall it change the time of default. Notwithstanding the sixty-day cure
period provided above, in the event more than sixty days is reasonably required to cure
a default and the Defaulting Party or some other party, within the sixty day cure
period, commence actions reasonably designed to cure the default, then the cure period
shall be extended for such additional period during which the Defaulting Party or such
other party is prosecuting those actions diligently to completion.
5.1.3 Remedies Upon Default.
(a)
Equitable Remedies: In the event a default remains uncured after proper
notice and the expiration of the applicable cure period without cure, the County
shall have the option of suing the Defaulting Party for specific performance or
pursuing such other remedies against the Defaulting Parties as are available in
equity. It is stipulated between the parties for purposes of any judicial
proceeding that the County need only establish the occurrence of default under
Section 5.1.1 of this Amended Agreement to obtain equitable relief.
(b)
Major Default:
A "major default" means a default which, taking
this Amended Agreement as a whole, has the effect of denying the County the
essential benefits of this Amended Agreement or placing upon the County
significant negative fiscal impacts not contemplated by this Amended
Agreement. In the event of a major default, the County shall have the option of
terminating this Amended Agreement in its entirety after proper notice and
expiration of the applicable cure periods without cure, and after exhaustion of
all equitable remedies, if applicable.
Section 5.2 Enforcement. The parties to this Amended Agreement recognize that the
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County has the right to enforce its rules, policies, regulations, and ordinances, subject to the
terms of this Amended Agreement, and may, at its option, seek an injunction to compel such
compliance. In the event that Developers or any user of the subject property violate the
rules, policies, regulations or ordinances of the County or violate the terms of this Amended
Agreement, the County may, without electing to seek an injunction and after sixty (60) days
written notice to correct the violation (or such longer period as may be established in the
discretion of the Board of County Commissioners or a court of competent jurisdiction if
Developers have used their reasonable best efforts to cure such violation within such sixty
(60) days and are continuing to use their reasonable best efforts to cure such violation), take
such actions as shall be deemed appropriate under law until such conditions have been
honored by the Developers. The County shall be free from any liability arising out of the
exercise of its rights under this Section; provided, however, that any party may be liable to
the other for the exercise of any rights in violation of Rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and/or Utah Code Annotated
Section 78-27-56, as each may be amended.
Section 5.3 Reserved Legislative Powers. Future Changes of Laws and Plans. Compelling
Countervailing Public Interest. Nothing in this Amended Agreement shall limit the future
exercise of the police power of the County in enacting zoning, subdivision, development,
growth management, platting, environmental, open space, transportation and other land use
plans, policies, ordinances and regulations after the date of this Amended Agreement.
Notwithstanding the retained power of the County to enact such legislation under the police
power, such legislation shall only be applied to modify the vested rights described in this
Amended Agreement based upon policies, facts and circumstances meeting the compelling,
countervailing public interest exception to the vested rights doctrine in the State of Utah.
(Western Land Equities. Inc. v. City of Logan. 617 P.2d 388 (Utah 1980) or successor case
and statutory law). Any such proposed change affecting the vested rights of the Developers
and other rights under this Amended Agreement shall be of general application to all
development activity in the Snyderville Basin; and unless the County declares an emergency,
the Developers shall be entitled to prior written notice and an opportunity to be heard with
respect to die proposed change and its applicability to The Canyons SPA Plan under the
compelling, countervailing public policy exception to the vested rights doctrine. In the event
that the County does not give prior written notice, Developers shall retain the right to be
heard before an open meeting of the Board of County Commissioners in the event
Developers allege that their rights under this Amended Agreement have been adversely
affected.
Section 5.4 Reversion to Regulations. Should the County terminate this Amended
Agreement under the provisions hereof, Developers' Property will thereafter comply with
and be governed by the applicable County Development Code and General Plan then in
existence, as well as with all other provisions of Utah State Law.
Section 5.5 Force Majeure.
0 0 5 5 3 9 11
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5.5 J Any default or inability to cure a default caused by strikes, lockouts, labor
disputes, acts of God, inability to obtain labor or materials or reasonable substitutes
therefor, enemy or hostile governmental action, civil commotion, fire or other
casualty, and other similar causes beyond the reasonable control of the party obligated
to perform, shall excuse the performance by such party for a period equal to the period
during which any such event prevented, delayed or stopped any required performance
or effort to cure a default.
5.5.2 In the event the real estate sales figures published by the Park City Board of
Realtors show a 20% or greater decline for real estate sales in the Park City area for
the comparable six-month period in the preceding year or if the number of beds rented
published by the Park City Chamber of Commerce/Convention and Visitors Bureau for
the Park City area shows a 10% or greater decline in the number of beds rented for the
comparable six-month period of the preceding year, then the RVMA and /or The
Colony Master Association may notify the Community Development Director of such
downturn in the economy and request a six-month extension of all the time limits set
forth herein. Upon the verification of such published figures, but in no event later than
twenty (20) days after such request, the Director shall grant a six-month extension on
all relevant dates of performance as set forth herein. The Director shall thereafter
immediately provide notice of such extension to the Planning Commission and BCC.
In the event such downturn continues, the Director may grant additional six month
extensions for the duration of the downturn. The RVMA may request and receive up
to a maximum of twenty-four (24) months of such extensions during the first fifteen
(15) years of the term of this Amended Agreement.
Section 5.6 Continuing Obligations. Adoption of law or other governmental activity making
performance by the Developers unprofitable, more difficult, or more expensive does not
excuse the performance of the obligations by the Developers.
Section 5.7 Other Remedies. All other remedies at law or in equity, which are consistent
with the provisions of this Amended Agreement, are available to the parties to pursue in the
event there is a breach.
Section 5.8 Dispute Resolution.
5.8,1 Binding Arbitration. In the event that the default mechanism contained herein
shall not sufficiently resolve a dispute under this Amended Agreement, then every such
continuing dispute, difference, and disagreement shall be referred to a single arbitrator
agreed upon by the parties, or if no single arbitrator can be agreed upon, an arbitrator
or arbitrators shall be selected in accordance with the rules of the American Arbitration
Association and such dispute, difference, or disagreement shall be resolved by the
binding decision of the arbitrator, and judgment upon the award rendered by the
arbitrator may be entered in any court having jurisdiction thereof. However, in no
instance shall this arbitration provision prohibit the County from exercising
0 0 5 5 3 9 11
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enforcement of its police powers where Developers are in direct violation of the Code.
5.8.2 Institution of Legal Action. Enforcement of any such arbitration decision shall
be instituted in the Third Judicial District Court of the County of Summit, State of
Utah, or in the United States District Court for Utah.
5.8.3 Rights of Third Parties. This Amended Agreement is not intended to affect or
create any additional rights or obligations on the part of third parties.
5.8.4 Third Party Legal Challenges. In those instances where, in this Amended
Agreement, Developers have agreed to waive a position with respect to the
applicability of current County policies and requirements, or where Developers have
agreed to comply with current County policies and requirements, Developers further
agree not to participate either directly or indirectly in any legal challenges to such
County policies and requirements by third parties, including but not limited to
appearing as a witness, amicus, making a financial contribution thereto, or otherwise
assisting in the prosecution of the action.
5.8.5 Enforced Delay. Extension of Times of Performance. In addition to specific
provisions of this Amended Agreement, performance by the County, the Master
Developer, or a Participating Landowner hereunder shall not be deemed to be in
default where delays or defaults are due to war, insurrection, strikes, walkouts, riots,
floods, earthquakes, fires, casualties, or acts of God. An extension of time for such
cause shall be granted in writing by County for the period of the enforced delay or
longer, as may be mutually agreed upon.
5.8.6 Attorney's Fees. Should any party hereto employ an attorney for the purpose
of enforcing this Amended Agreement, or any judgment based on this Amended
Agreement, or for any reasons or in any legal proceeding whatsoever, including
insolvency, bankruptcy, arbitration, declaratory relief or other litigation, including
appeals or re-hearings, and whether or not an action has actually commenced, the
prevailing party shall be entitled to receive from the other party thereto reimbursement
for all attorney's fees and all costs and expenses. Should any judgment or final order
be issued in that proceeding, said reimbursement shall be specified therein.
5.8.7 Venue. Venue for all legal proceedings related to this Amended Agreement
shall be in the District Court for the County of Summit, in Coalville, Utah.
5.8.8 Damages upon Termination. Except with respect to just compensation and
attorneys' fees under this Amended Agreement, Developers shall not be entitled to any
damages against the County upon the unlawful termination of this Amended
Agreement.
Section 5.9 Term of Agreement and Automatic Renewal.
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SUMMIT COUNTY, UTAH; APRIL 24, 2009

2

JUDGE BRUCE LUBECK

3

(Transcriber's note: Speaker identification

4

may not be accurate with audio recordings)

5

P R O C E E D I N G S

6

THE COURT:

Good morning.

We'll call ASC vs. Wolf

7

and others, 060500297 on calendar for argument on several

8

motions.

9

and who you represent and I think there's more than two of

10

you.

11
12

MS. FITLOW:

Wolf Mountain, Victoria Fitlow for

Wolf Mountain this morning.

13
14

So let's have you state for the record who you are

MR. WING:

Robert Wing on behalf of Enoch Richard

Smith.

15

MR. ASHTON:

16

MR. BOREN:

John Ashton and Clark Taylor for ASCU.
Your Honor, Jason Boren on behalf of

17

third party defendants Joseph Croftcheck, English Inn, White

18

Pine Development, Deer Pack Development, Orem Development,

19

Paul Barker, William Snyder and David Lawson in his capacity

20

as trustee of the Lawson Family Trust.

21

MR. MORTENSEN:

Good morning Your Honor, David

22

Mortensen and Boren Sherman appearing on behalf of IHC Health

23

Services Inc.

24
25

MR. YEATES:
name is Ken Yeates.

Your Honor, if the Court please, my
I'm here with Kyle Thompson on behalf of

1

Development Agreement, these are the rules, this is what

2

everybody can do with their property, we're all going to do

3

some trades and we're going to put in some land and we're

4

going to get a golf course because then what we have left is

5

a lot of valuable because there's a golf course there.

6

ASCU is seeking to hold Wolf Mountain liable in

7

contract and in tort, there's an intentional interference

8

tort claim here, for failing to convey the lands for the golf

9

course.

ASCU, they allege a parade of horribles in their

10

damages section.

They've alleged everything from lost

11

revenue from the golf course to lost investment in the golf

12

course, their out-of-pocket investment to date, lost profits

13

from delayed or lost real estate development, lost skier

14

days, damage to their financial and credit reputation, damage

15

to their good will, their professional reputation.

16

Wolf Mountain didn't give up this land and that caused just

17

this whole parade of horribles.

18

Mountain the right to apportion fault for those damages to

19

third parties.

20

whatever reason, Wolf Mountain is still going to be entitled

21

to allocate fault and I think we've heard that here today.

22

So we're still going to have to do all that discovery that's

23

been laid out as a reason why they shouldn't be joined.

24

That's still going to have to happen.

25

gets to allocate fault, even to non-parties if they can't be

It's bad.

Well, the ULRA gives Wolf

Even if they can't be made parties for

Wolf Mountain still
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1

joined for whatever reason, if they're immune pursuit or

2

unknown tort feasors, whatever, if they're not parties, we

3

still get to allocate fault because the benchmark, the

4

touchstone of the ULRA is the statement that no party can be

5

held liable for more than their proportionate share of fault.

6

So even if those parties aren't in this claim, they're still

7

going to have to deal with the issue of how much of it was

8

their fault and how much of it was out fault and apportion

9

damages and with the specific performance claims that are in

10

here, isn't it better to have them in so that when we decide,

11

Okay, well, this was your fault, that was your fault, this

12

was their fault, now everybody put in and ASCU build the golf

13

course.

14

blowup consolidated litigation which is what we already have

15

and that's what we're trying to do.

16

Let's get that all resolved in one big, nasty,

And I've already mentioned without the third party

17

landowners in this case we run the risk of inconsistent

18

rulings and I don't know how to resolve that absent having

19

those parties in here.

20

is to have them all included in the litigation and subject to

21

this Court's rulings.

22

The only situation that makes sense

Now, one brief argument that GEC made in its

23

pleadings was that these third party claims don't allege that

24

a third party is liable to Wolf Mountain for all or part of

25

the claims that are asserted against Wolf Mountain and I
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1

think that's just wrong.

2

against Wolf Mountain is that it must give up land for the

3

golf course.

4

declaratory judgment claim.

5

owners that are also subject to that same SPA Development

6

Agreement, which is a contract they all entered into with

7

Wolf Mountain, with ASCU, then they're liable to Wolf

8

Mountain to turn over their land for the golf course.

9

that's exactly what Wolf Mountain has alleged in the third

10
11

Wolf Mountain, ASCU's claims

There's a specific performance claim and a
Then the third parties who are

And

party complaint.
Now this issue of the county being the sole

12

enforcer and the arbitration provision of the SPA Development

13

Agreement, I'd like to - I don't know if everyone has their

14

copy of the SPA Development Agreement but

15

attached as an exhibit to one of the motions.

16

would like, I'd be happy to provide you with my copy but

17

Article V, is the provision on default and that's what's

18

cited by IHC and the Croftcheck parties with relation to this

19

standing and arbitration argument.

20

Development Agreement doesn't make the county the sole

21

enforcer of the SPA Development Agreement.

22

had taken that position and that's a something that's being

23

parroted here but it's just not the case and the SPA

24

Development Agreement also does not have an exclusive

25

arbitration provision.

(inaudible)
If the Court

It's not true - the SPA

That's not true.

I know the county

Section 5 sets out
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1

a default mechanism and default here is a defined term.

2

it's not just any generic breach.

3

the county can declare a default mechanism.

4

Section 5 does is it preserves the county's right to act as a

5

municipality and to act as a governmental enforcing body and

6

it sets out the county can declare a default, you have 60

7

days to cure.

8

resolved, then we go to arbitration.

9

provision specifically says, this is 5.1.3, "If a default"

When there is a default,
Basically what

If you don't cure, if that doesn't get ir
The arbitration

10

which is a defined term which has to be declared by the

11

county, "if a default goes uncured then the county" I

12

apologize, that's the wrong provision.

13

provision.

14

So

Here it is.

Let me find the right

"The arbitration provision, Section

15

5.8.1 provides for binding arbitration but only in the event

16

the default mechanism contained herein shall not sufficiently

17

resolve the dispute under this amended agreement."

18

doesn't say, as Mr. Boren claimed, that all disputes arising

19

under this agreement must be submitted to binding

20

arbitration.

21

the event that the default mechanism doesn't work and it

22

doesn't get it resolved - the county declares a default, we

23

have time to resolve it, it doesn't get resolved - then you

24

go to arbitration.

25

declared by the county against these third parties so that

It doesn't say that.

It

All it says is that in

Well, there hasn't been any default
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Tab 3

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SUMMIT COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
ASC UTAH, INC a Maine
corporation, dba THE CANYONS,
Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING and ORDER
Case No. 060500297
Judge BRUCE C. LUBECK

WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, LC, a
Utah limited liability company,
Defendant.

WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, LC,
Plaintiff,
vs.
ASC UTAH, a Maine corporation,
dba THE CANYONS; AMERICAN
SKIING COMPANY, INC., a
Delaware corporation; AMERICAN
SKIING COMPANY RESORT
PROPERTIES, INC. a Maine
corporation; CORPORATE DOES 150; LESLIE B. OTTEN; BLAISE
CARRIG; INDIVIDUAL DOES 1-50,
Defendants

Case No. 060500404

STEPHEN A. OSGUTHORPE; D.A.
OSGUTHORPE individually and in
his capacity as Trustee of the
DR. D.A. OSGUTHORPE TRUST; and
D.A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY
PARTNERSHIP,

Case no. 070500018
(formerly SL Department
case 060913348

Plaintiffs,
vs.
WOLF MOUNTAIN RESORTS, LC,
Defendant.

ENOCH RICHARD SMITH, as
Personal Representative of the
Estate of ENOCH SMITH, JR.,
Intervener,

STEPHEN A. OSGUTHORPE; D.A.
OSGUTHORPE, individually and in
his capacity as Trustee of the |
DR. D.A. OSGUTHORPE TRUST; and J
D.A. OSGUTHORPE FAMILY
PARTNERSHIP,
Case No. 070500520
Plaintiffs,
vs.
DATE: June 26, 2009

ASC UTAH, INC; AMERICAN SKIING
COMPANY; and LESLIE B. OTTEN,
Defendants

The above matter came before the court for decision on
Wolf's motion to compel arbitration.

2

The motion was filed May 20, 2009.

ASCU (or the ASC

parties) filed an opposition response on June 12, 2009.

Wolf

filed a reply June 18, 2009, as well as a Request to Submit.

The court has reviewed the pleadings and determined oral is
not necessary.

At the last hearing held June 5, 2009, and in a

subsequent order, the court indicated it would rule based on the
pleadings.

The issues involved give the court are not

dispositive.

Oral argument would not benefit the court. The

court will decide the issues based on the pleadings.

ARGUMENTS
Under the Utah Arbitration Act, UCA 78-31a-l, Wolf moves for
an order to compel arbitration of all claims related to the Amended
and Restated Development Agreement for the Canyons Specifically
Planned Area ("SPA Agreement"), as is required by the Agreement's
§5.8.1.

Wolf claims that in its April 29, 2009 Ruling and Order,

the court concluded that the SPA Agreement contains a mandatory
arbitration provision, requiring any claim that the agreement was
violated to be arbitrated.

Accordingly, Wolf filed its Demand for

Arbitration on May 18, 2009, seeking arbitration of the various
parties' disputes under the SPA Agreement.

Arbitration will

likely resolve 80-90% of the disputes in this consolidated case,

3

and ensures that the various parties will receive consistent
interpretation of their rights and avoid conflicting rulings and
remedies regarding the issues under the agreement.

Arbitration

will also conserve judicial resources and expense to the parties.
As facts Wolf claims that ASCU, ASC, and a group of
participating landowners, including Wolf, entered into the SPA
Agreement on November 15, 1999.

On July 28, 2006, ASCU filed its

First Amended Complaint alleging violations of the agreement and
seeking remedies.

ASCU alleges that (1) Wolf breached the

contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
failing to convey required portions of land for the golf course
development project and by failing to consent and execute necessary
documents to facilitate development of the specially planned area;
(2) Wolf intentionally interfered with ASCU's prospective economic
relations under rights ASCU obtained under the agreement; (3) a
dispute exists between the parties concerning their obligations
under the SPA Agreement to develop a golf course; and (4) ASCU is
entitled to a decree of specific performance requiring Wolf to
convey the requested portions of land for the golf development
project.

On December 18, 2006, Wolf filed it Answer and

Counterclaim also alleging violations of the SPA Agreement by ASCU
and sought remedies.

Wolf alleges that (1) ASCU breached the

contract and implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by
failing to fulfill its development obligations; (2) ASCU committed

4

trespass to chattels and/or conversion by its acts relative to the
agreement and golf course development; and (3) ASCU committed a
prima facie tort by its acts relative to the agreement and golf
course development.
Wolf asserted substantially identical claims in its First
Amended Complaint in Case No. 060500404, filed December 19, 2006.
Wolf then filed a Motion to Amend and a Third-Party Complaint
against the D.A. Osguthorpe Family Partnership and the remaining
participating landowners.

Wolf's Motion to Amend was denied for

various procedural reasons, but the court did conclude that the SPA
Agreement §5.8.1 requires arbitration of W o l f s claims that the
agreement was violated.

As a result, Wolf filed a Demand for

Arbitration against all parties to the SPA Agreement on May 18,
2009.
From these facts Wolf asserts that Utah law favors arbitration
of disputes because it is a practical and inexpensive means of
settling a dispute while easing court congestion.

Chandler

Cross

The court may

Blue

Shield,

833 P. 2d 356,

358

(Utah 1992).

v.

Blue

determine "the existence of an arbitration agreement or the scope
of the matters covered by the agreement."

UCA 78-31a-4(l).

Also,

"once the court finds that there is an enforceable agreement to
arbitrate... the court shall order the parties to arbitrate."
Here, the court has already determined in its April 29, 2009
Ruling and Order that §5.8.1 of the SPA Agreement requires that
5

disputes claiming violation of the agreement require arbitration.
Both parties are alleging breach of the SPA Agreement by the other,
thus the present disputes are subject to mandatory arbitration.
Furthermore, Wolf has already filed a Demand for Arbitration
regarding both disputes in this case and the cases against third
parties.

Thus, the court should grant Wolf's Motion.

However,

if the court denies this Motion, arbitration will still proceed
under the SPA Agreement against third parties not involved with
this consolidated case.

The arbitration will include some of the

same issues and parties involved in this case, which could lead to
inconsistent interpretations of the agreement and rulings.
single arbitration would correct this problem.

A

Wolf estimates

that 80-90% of the disputes found in these consolidated cases would
be resolved by the arbitration, while conserving judicial resources
and less expense to the parties.

In opposition ASCU argues that Wolf is again attempting to
derail this action.

Three years have passed since ASCU filed its

First Amended Complaint in July, 2006.

During the three years,

Wolf has participated in discovery and the court has heard and
ruled upon several dispositive and other motions.

Discovery

closes in less than three weeks, yet Wolf filed a Motion to Compel
Arbitration of all claims related to The Canyons SPA Agreement.
None of ASCU's nor Wolf's causes of action allege a breach of

6

the SPA Agreement.

All claims Wolf refers to in support of its

Motion to Compel Arbitration are based upon conduct under, or
breaches of, the July 3, 1997 Ground Lease.

Ground Lease claims

are not subject to the mandatory arbitration provision of the SPA
Agreement just because the Ground Lease claims may relate to the
golf course or some aspect of the SPA Agreement.
In addition, Wolf has waived its right to compel arbitration
of claims made in 2006.
this litigation

For three years Wolf has participated in

without intent to arbitrate.

This participation

results in prejudice to ASCU if its claims are now sent to
arbitration.
ASCU claims as facts relevant to this motion that

ASCU's

July 2006 First Amended Complain does not allege various violations
of the SPA Agreement, contrary to Wolf's assertion.

ASCU's claims

against Wolf stem from the Ground Lease, as the court recognized in
its April 29, 2009 Ruling and Order.

Wolf points to Paragraphs

90 and 94 of ASCU's FAC to support its proposition that ASCU is
seeking remedies under the SPA Agreement.

However, Paragraph 90

alleges "Wolf breached the Ground Lease by the conduct alleged
above..."

Paragraph 94 also asserts a breach of the implied

covenant of good faith and fair dealing under the Ground Lease.
ASCU's FAC specifically alleges that Wolf breached its
obligations under §25.03 and the Second Amendment of the Ground
Lease by refusing to appear at an April 21, 2006, closing to convey

7

the necessary property to ASCU for the golf course.

Paragraph

99 of ASCU's FAC spells out Wolf's intentional interference with
ASCU's economic relations.

It states that in breaching the Ground

Lease and acting in bad faith, uWolf

intended to interfere, and

did interfere with ASCU's existing and potential relation arising
from the golf course project and The Canyons specially planned
area."

Under ASCU FAC 5108, ASCU seeks a declaratory judgment

that it has performed all material conditions required under the
Ground Lease, except conditions waived, excused or prevented by
Wolf."

ASCU also seeks a declaration that Wolf must convey the

golf course land under §25.03 and the Second Amendment of the
Ground Lease.

Also under the same section of the Ground Lease, in

Paragraph 119, ASCU seeks specific performance under the Ground
Lease, requiring Wolf to convey the golf course land.
Under Wolf's Counterclaims and First Amended Complaint,
contrary to Wolf's assertion, of December, 2006, Wolf does not
allege various violations of the SPA Agreement by ASCU or that Wolf
is seeking remedies thereunder.

Wolf has used a partial quote

from its Counterclaims, % 68(3), in a misleading manner to make it
seem that Wolf claims a Third Cause of Action, seeking damages
under the SPA Agreement for a violation of the SPA Agreement.
When reading the entirety of 1 68 of Wolf's Counterclaim,
there is no question that Wolf is not seeking remedies under the
SPA Agreement.

Paragraph 68 states, "ASCU materially breached the
8

Ground Lease by the conduct alleged above, including.. . 3) various
failures to fulfill its development obligations under the Ground
Lease and SPA Agreement (which is further incorporated as an
obligation under the Second Amendment [to the Ground Lease]
including... a) Frostwood; b) Golf course."

Furthermore, 1 71 of

Wolf's Counterclaim concludes its Third Cause of Action by seeking
to terminate the Ground Lease and recover damages upon ASCU's
alleged breaches of the Ground Lease.

Wolf's paraphrasing of

its Sixth Cause of Action also selectively omits any reference to
the Ground Lease.

Wolf instead alleges a violation of the SPA

Agreement, seeking remedies, because ASCU committed trespass to
chattels and/or conversion by its acts relative to the SPA
Agreement and golf Course.

However, paragraph 81 actually

alleges, UASCU intentionally interfered with Wolf Mountain's rights
under the Osguthorpe Lease and/or otherwise dispossess Wolf of its
rights under the Ground Lease by the following... 3) SPA Agreement;
4) Frostwood; 5) Willow Draw; 6) golf course development."

Thus,

Wolf is seeking remedies based upon its rights under the Ground
Lease.
The entire history of this case and a review of the court
docket indicates that Wolf has participated in discovery during the
past three years, with discovery set to close at the end of June
2009.

The court has also heard and ruled upon several motions,

many of which were filed by Wolf.
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The parties anticipate a trial

that will last about 30 days, with the court indicating it may be
able to set trial in April, 2010.

A scheduling conference will

occurring July, 2009 to set a trial date.
From these facts ASCU argues Wolf has used one sentence of
dicta from this court's April 29, 2009 Ruling and Order to argue
that this court intended for all golf course related claims in this
litigation be compelled into arbitration.

The April 29 Ruling

thwarted Wolf's attempt to add eleven other landowners to this
case, and this court saw the distinction between these new claims
against third parties, seeking redress under the SPA Agreement, and
ASCU's claims against Wolf.

"The original claims against Wolf,

involving the failure to give the land necessary for the golf
course to ASCU, stem from the Ground Lease Agreement; a contract to
which none of the third party defendants are a party."

The

arbitration provision in the SPA Agreement does not apply to the
Ground Lease Claims in this case simply because they may relate to
the golf course.

The arbitration provision applies to disputes

arising under the Amended SPA Agreement, in the event the default
mechanism for resolving disputes fails.

Through selective

paraphrasing, Wolf hopes to convince this court into believing that
both ASCU and Wolf seek remedies under the SPA Agreement for
Violations of the SPA Agreement.

Instead, both parties only seek

remedies under the Ground Lease or for conduct that is a breach of
10

the Ground Lease.

The arbitration

provision of the SPA Agreement

does not extend to all third-party contractual or tort claims that
may relate to the SPA Agreement.

Also, Wolf has asserted claims in

this litigation against third parties who are not signatories to
the SPA Agreement and are not subject to its provisions.

These

third parties include ASC, Leslie Otten and Blaise Carrig.

Wolf

recognized these parties are not subject to the SPA Agreement by
not naming them as parties in its arbitration demand.
Because ASCU's and Wolf's claims related to the golf course are
causes of action for breach of the Ground Lease, they are not
subject to the arbitration provision of the SPA Agreement.

The

court should deny the motion to compel arbitration solely on this
basis.
However, as an additional ground to deny this motion of Wolf,
the ASC parties argue that Wolf has waived its right to
arbitration.
At this late stage, the ASC Parties would by prejudiced if the
claims alleged in 2006 were compelled into arbitration as Wolf has
substantially participated in this litigation.

Although public

policy favors arbitration, a party should not be allowed to suffer
prejudice because of the opposing party's failure to timely assert

a contractual right.
833 P.2d

356,

360

Chandler

(Utah

v. Blue Cross Blue Shield

of

Utah,

1992) . A party can waive its right to
11

arbitration based upon "both a finding of participation in
litigation to a point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate and
a finding of prejudice.

The Utah Supreme Court has reaffirmed

this two prong test on multiple occasions.
Inc.

v.

Chandler

911,

Parkwest

Assoc,

test.); Cedar

914 (Utah 2004)

40 P.3d
Surgery

599,

Ctr.,

608
L.L.C.

See Cent. Florida
(Utah 2002)
v.

Inv.,

(utilizing

Bonelli,

96

P.3d

("the party alleging waiver must demonstrate

(1) that the party seeking arbitration substantially participated
in the underlying litigation to a point inconsistent with the
intent to arbitrate; and (2) that this participation resulted in
prejudice to the opposing party.''); and Baker v. Stevens,
580 (Utah 2005)

114 P.3d

(seeking party waived its right to compel

arbitration because it filed a summary judgment motion). The first
prong of the Chandler

test, whether the party seeking arbitration

has substantially participated in litigation to a point
inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate, requires a court to
consider the action of the party seeking arbitration and "determine
whether those actions evidence an intent to submit to the
jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through litigation."
Cedar Surgery

Ctr.,

L.L.C,

96 P.3d

at

914.

The types of

participation in litigation that should be considered are by order
of weight from least to most: participation in discovery and other
aspects of litigation that do not necessarily involve the court;
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requests made of the court by the parties; whether the parties'
requests of the court demonstrate and intent to pursue litigation
as compared to an intent to avoid litigation and a desire to be

sent to arbitration.
In Chandler,

Cent.

Florida

Inv.,

Inc.,

40 P.3d at

609.

the Utah Supreme Court held that Blue Cross

participated in litigation to a point inconsistent with arbitration
when, prior to filing its Motion to Compel Arbitration, it filed an
answer, a cross-claim, partook in discovery for five months, and
reviewed discovery prior to its entrance in this case.

"These

actions clearly manifest and intent to proceed to trial."
Here, the first prong of the Chandler
satisfied.

test is easily

ASCU filed its First Amended Complaint in July, 2006.

Instead of immediately moving to compel arbitration, Wolf filed a
motion to dismiss, and after that was denied, filed its own
separate suit, answer and counterclaim.

Wolf also failed to raise

the right to arbitration as an affirmative defense in its answer.
Furthermore, Wolf has extensively litigated this case over the past
three years.

Wolf's actions demonstrate uan intent to submit to

the jurisdiction of the court and pursue redress through
litigation," rather than an intent to arbitrate.
The second prong of the Chandler

test, whether Wolf's

participation in the litigation results in prejudice to the
opposing parties if arbitration is ordered, may be shown in various
ways.

"Where the party seeking to compel arbitration engages in
13

discovery proceedings not available in arbitration, causes
extensive or unreasonable expenses or delay by delaying the
invocation of arbitration proceedings, or makes motions going to
the merits of the adversary's claims," those actions may indicate
prejudice to the opposing party.

"Any real detriment is

sufficient to support a finding of prejudice."
at

360.

In Chandler,

Chandler,

833

P.2d

the court relied on the discovery conducted

and the expense incurred in the litigation. The ASC Parties have
been prejudiced by Wolf's participation in this litigation and
failure to request arbitration in a timely manner.

Wolf has

participated in a broad discovery and motion practice that would
not have been available in arbitration.

Any depositions useful in

an arbitration proceeding would likely have to be redone with a
different focus, since the eleven other landowners included in
Wolf's demand for arbitration have not participated in discovery in
this case.

Arbitration of the SPA Agreement issues with third

parties will not resolve Wolf's and ASCU's disputes under the
Ground Lease.

Moreover, Wolf has asserted claims in this

litigation against third parties who are not signatories to the SPA
Agreement, and not subject to its provisions.

Recognizing this,

Wolf did not name these third parties in its arbitration demand.
Thus, no efficiencies or conservation of judicial resources are to
be achieved by compelling arbitration at this late juncture.
Instead, arbitration would be an inefficient duplication of effort

14

causing further delay.

Wolf uses the Court's April 29, 2009

Ruling and Order as a basis for its eleventh hour demand for
arbitration.

It is simply too late.

In the Utah Supreme Court's

seminal decision on this issue it states, "the policies favoring
arbitration are largely defeated when the right of arbitration is
not raised until an opposing party has undertaken much of the
expense necessary to prepare a case for trial."
at

361.

Chandlery,

833

P.2d

Wolf's late arbitration demand is not justified by the

Court's April 29 Ruling because Wolf has been aware of both
parties' pertinent claims since 2006, and was aware of the
existence of the arbitration provision in the SPA Agreement.

Wolf

has chosen to litigate these claims in this Court, and that parties
have spent three years undertaking much of the expense necessary to
complete discovery and prepare for trial.

In reply Wolf points out that ASCU does not dispute (1) this
court's statement that the SPA agreement requires arbitration of
disputes thereunder; (2) the validity of the arbitration clause in
the SPA Agreement; (3) public policy in favor of arbitration; (4)
the mandatory language of the Utah Arbitration Act - that parties
"shall" arbitrate disputes subject to a valid arbitration*
agreement; or (5) the likelihood of inconsistent rulings and
remedies for both parties to this case and third parties if the
same issues are resolved in different forums."
15

ASCU instead claims

that Wolf has waived arbitration and made a blatant attempt to
mislead this court by identifying the portions of the parties'
pleadings that allege violations under the SPA Agreement.
W o l f s Motion is aimed at following the direction of this court in
that the SPA Agreement "requires arbitration'' and "any claim by
Wolf that the SPA Agreement was violated... is subject to the
mandatory arbitration provision."

Accordingly, Wolf seeks

arbitration of the SPA Agreement dispute of all persons involved in
those dispute, including the parties in this case.
Contrary to ASCU's depiction, this case involves disputes
under both the Ground Lease and SPA Agreement.

The parties have

been litigating this case for a long time, but the court no longer
has jurisdiction where claims arise under a valid arbitration
agreement.

This court's April 29 Ruling reversed Wolf's position

that it had the right to arbitrate disputes under the SPA
Agreement, resulting in this motion.

This court should not hold

that Wolf has waived arbitration due to the "strong presumption
against finding that a party waived its right to arbitration."
Wolf is already arbitrating these issues with the parties to
the SPA Agreement that are not parties in this case, as per the
court's Order.

The SPA Agreement disputes must be resolved one way

or another - either partially in this court and partially in
arbitration, or together in the forum and manner that the parties
to the SPA Agreement specifically agreed to.
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If done partially in

this court and partially in arbitration, adjudications, remedies
and results may conflict and be interpreted and enforced
differently.

It would be better to handle it all in arbitration.

Thus, given what the ASC parties do NOT contest, aside from
its waiver argument, ASCU concedes that there is no basis under
Utah statutes, case law, concerns of fairness to third parties, or
this court's own rulings for this court to deny arbitration of any
disputes under the SPA Agreement.
ASCU posits that the disputes in this case do not fall under
the arbitration clause of the SPA Agreement.

ASCU fails to

address the language of the arbitration clause, even though this
language is a court's primary focus in determining whether
arbitration is needed on certain claims.

See Cummings

Ground

1261

Package

Sys.,

Inc.,

404 F.3d

1258,

(10th

v.

FedEx

Cir.

2005)

("where the arbitration clause is broad, there arises a presumption
of arbitrability and arbitration of even a collateral matter will
be ordered if the claim alleged implicates issues of contract
construction or the parties' rights and obligations under it.");
In determining arbitrability, a court is to look upon the
relationship of the claim to the subject matter of the arbitration
clause.

Here, the arbitration clause provides that if a dispute

arises under the Amended SPA Agreement, then every dispute,
difference and disagreement shall be referred to arbitration.
Thus, this court must assess whether any of the claims in this case
17

constitute a "dispute, difference [or] disagreement under" the SPA
Agreement - in substance, not in how they are pleaded or
characterized.

In ASCU's FAC, ASCU asserts that Wolf is liable for

breach of contract by "failing to convey the required portions of
its land for the golf course development project."

This topic

does not fall under the Ground Lease, except where the Ground Lease
refers to or incorporates the SPA Agreement.

ASCU only shows that

it pleaded a breach of the Ground Lease, but fails to show that
this dispute truly arises under the Ground Lease, which was
executed years before the golf course development project arose.
The golf course development project is actually a requirement of
the SPA Agreement.

The failure of the golf course development

project is a "dispute, difference, [or] disagreement under" the SPA
Agreement.

Also in its FAC, ASCU claims Wolf is liable for breach

of contract by "failing to consent to and execute necessary
documents to facilitate the development of the specially planned
area."

The Ground Lease does not describe any "specially planned

area," yet this is what the acronym SPA stands for and is the
subject of the SPA Agreement.
is immaterial.

How ASCU characterized this dispute

Additionally, the ASCU FAC claims that Wolf

intentionally interfered with ASCU's prospective economic relations
under rights ASCU obtained under the Ground lease and the SPA
Agreement.

This claim discusses the golf course development

project, the golf course transaction, and other development
18

projects discussed 11 1 -dep11 1 :i i 1 11: 1 e SPA Agreemen 1:

T1 ie ASCU FAC

also alleges "A dispute exists between the parties regarding their
respective obligations under the Ground I .ease and t.he SPA Agreement
::.,<*; i: •

for the development of a golf course ,

11 ie

substance of this clai m i s whether Wolf is required to convey the
portions of land for the golf course development project under the
SPA Agreement.

ASCU seeks specific performance of Wo]f conveying

this land, which its squarely within the SPA Agreement.
Furthermore, W o l f s counterclaims assert breaches/disputes under
both the Ground Lease and the SPA Agreement,

Regardless of how

characterized, several disputes at issue in this care are
" di sputes,, d:i f f e rence s

• : n : di sa gr eement s t :ii ide i

11 i• B S PA Agr eemei It.

As noted, contracts are to be interpreted "in favor of arbitration,
in keeping with our policy of encouraging extrajudicial resolution
o f d :i s p i 11 e s w h e i i t h e p a r t i e s h a v e i I o t a g r e e d t :> J i t :i g a t i :> i I ."'"
v.

Davis

County

Scb.

D ist., 892 P. 2d 1063,

1065

(Utah App.

Reed

1995).

Wolf claims i t has not waived arbitration. The Utah
L e g i s 1 a t u r e I I a s i i o t p e r i a i 11 e d w a i v e r o £ a r b i t r a t i o i i

1 11 i :i a r 11 I e

Utah Arbitration Act, the court may determine "the existence of an
arbitration agreement or the scope of matters covered by tlle
agreem* >i il

I J 21

; 8 3 1 , :i 4 ( ] 9 9 9 )

: i :i ;<• ; 1 .1 i, 2 < :< n 1:1 1 : f:i 1 i< k ; « 11 1

enforceable agreement to arbitrate, the court "shall order the
parties to arbitrate."

"Where the evidence relating to a

purported agreement to arbitrate is undisputed, the district
19

court... must compel arbitration.'7
of

Utah,

20 P.3d

901,

904

McCoy v. Blue Cross Blue

(Utah 2001).

Shield

The requirement that the

court order arbitration is "mandatory, and ... jurisdictional."
Cache

County

v.

Property

Tax Div.,

922 P. 2d 758,

764

(Utah

1996).

Thus, this court does not have jurisdiction to proceed with SPA
Agreement claims that are subject to the valid arbitration clause.
Additionally, Wolf has not previously demanded arbitration
because it had believed and maintained the position that it did not
have a right to seek arbitration of disputes under the SPA
Agreement without Summit Country first declaring a default per the
terms of that provision.

Under Utah law, a waiver is the

intentional relinquishment of a known right.
Loan Ass'n

v.

Blomquist,

445 P.2d

1, 3 (Utah

American
1968).

Sav.

and

This court's

April 29, 2009 Ruling is what made Wolf aware that "any claim by
Wolf that the SPA Agreement was violated in some way is subject to
the mandatory arbitration provision in that agreement."

So, in

adherence with this ruling, Wolf sought to arbitrate these claims,
filing a Demand for Arbitration and this Motion to Compel
Arbitration 16 days later.

This does not constitute a knowing and

intentional waiver of arbitration by Wolf.

Notably, "there is a

strong presumption against waiver of the right to arbitrate."
Cent.
2002).

Fla.

Invs.,

Inc.

v.

Parkwest

Assocs.,

40 P.3d

599,

Consequently, waiving a right to* arbitrate must be

20

608

(Utah

intent i o i i. a .1 , a i 1 d i 11a ^ <: i: 1,3 ;«y b e i n f e r i: e d w 1 i e r e 11 I e p a r t: y s e e k i i i g
Baker

arbitration intended to disregard its right to arbitrate.
Steven-,,

•;

P. 3d 580,

583

(Utah 2005).

v.

Since Wolf's position that

it c.i,i not h a v e a r i g h t t o a r b i t r a t e w a s r e c e n t l y r e v e r s e d b y this
court

-

IF. A p r i l 2 9 R u l i n g , c o u p l e d w i t h t h e U t a h c o u r t s ' strong

p r e s urn | *

•

: ; f j i i d :i i I g « •

""" ' '' w a :i v e d :i 1: s r i g 1 I t t o

a r b i t r a t i o n , t h i s c o u r t s h o u l d not h o l d that W o l f h a s w a i v e d i t s
right to arbitration.
c o I i ] d a i i :i :i :i :i w a :i ^ r e a r 1: • :i 11: a t :i <: > i I , a r b :i 11: a t :i o i I

E' -<

r e m a i n s t h e m o s t l o g i c a l a n d b e n e f i c i a l s o l u t i o n for t h e p a r t i e s t o
t h e S P A A g r e e m e n t , i n c l u d i n g the p a r t i e s t o t h i s c a s e .
i i :i. :i t :i a 1 m e m o r a .

In v -

> w e d 1:1 i a t a r b i t r a;

under the SPA Agreement against persons thai

- < * id

ir- W-JZ parties to

this consolidated case even if this Motion, is denied.

The

a rb i t r a t i o i i :i i I c 11 i d e s s orrte o f 11 i e s ame i s s u e s t I i: ide i: 11 I e S PA
Agreement among t h e same persons w h o are parties in this case.
Proceeding simultaneously in this action and - h h the arbitration
regarding tl le same disputes could subject .". .

- he parties to

inconsistent interpretations, rulings and remedies under the
agreement

Inconsistency could make it difficult for any party to

comply with both this court's rulings and the arbitrator's
decisions, plus m a k e i* r.oie di.rflcult for ail
i n d < •['•'-•

•- i *

a r b i t r a t i o n •*• :

'

parties to

>*",! - - b

••niformly resolve abou1 ^0- -JWS -OL uie d i s p u t e s

under the SPA Agreement and presently found in these consolidated
cases.

ASCU has left most of these arguments undisputed.

Arbitration provides the best and most uniform determination for
Wolf, ASCU, and numerous other third parties.

DISCUSSION
In its April 29, 2009 Ruling, this Court acknowledged that
disputes, differences or disagreements arising under the SPA
Agreement are subject to arbitration, pursuant to §5.8.1 of the SPA
Agreement.
Arbitration.

As a result, Wolf then filed this Motion to Compel
The court is aware that Wolf now has new lead counsel

and changes in approach to the case are understandable.
Wolf claims that 80-90% of the disputes in this case will be
resolved by arbitration while avoiding conflicting interpretation
of, and remedies under, the SPA Agreement if required to litigate
this case in addition to arbitration with others that are not
parties in this case.

The court is required to resolve two issues:

(1) whether the arbitration provision of the SPA Agreement applies
to the issues in dispute in this case; and (2) whether Wolf has
waived its right to arbitration.

I.
Does the arbitration provision of the spa agreement apply to
the issues in dispute in this case?

22

I Ii ider U C A 7 8 B 1 1 J 0 i (3)

1 .1 I. i i ; < :< >i I. i I

; ;1 i< LI ] deed d e whethi ir

controversy is subject to an agreement to arbitrate.''

"The court

shall... order t h e parties to arbitrate unless it finds there is no
UCA 7 8B 11 1 08 (1 ) (1 ) .

enforceable agreement to arbitrate.''

Furthermore, where t h e "arbitration clause is broad, there arises a
presumpti on of arbitrability and .-"bi^rn* : -<r M : «ven a collateral
matter will b e ordered if t h e claii. s i e g e d implicates issues of...
the parties' rights a:.-J obligations under it [the c o n t r a c t ] . "
Cuinni i i igs \

B '" sdEx Grc

Cir.

In Cummings,

2005).

> * *! i

' *•.

'

[idth

a provision that "refers to ail disputes

arising out of a contract to arbitration," is broad.
1262.

'

Tl ie S.Pi i Kqre*^

:-

404 F.3d

-'

:^*ei

-t

if the default m e c h a n i s m fails to sufficiently resolve a dispute,
"then every such continuing dispute, difference and disagreement
shall" be referred to an arbitrator.

Thus, t:llis is a broad

provision which lends to a presumption of arbitrability to matters
ever I coJ 1 atera] to t h e SPA Agreement,

T h e A S C parties posit that

the arbitration p r o v i s i o n of the SPA Agreement simp.iy does not
apply to this case because all causes of action and remedies are
brought i II ider tl ie Groi m d Lease alone.

The court recognizes that

"the original claims against Wo] f, involving the failure to give
•the land necessary f o r'<tv

qolf course t-, ASCII, stem from t h e

hioiind Ijuust- Agreement ,
]6,,i

lloweven, many claims in this case relate to the golf course
23

a

development project or the specially planned area, which are
requirements and subjects of the SPA Agreement, not the Ground
Lease.

At a minimum, the claims at issue in this case are

collateral to the SPA Agreement by implicating the parties' rights
and obligations under the SPA Agreement.

Thus, the issues in

dispute in this case may very well be arbitrable under the broad
arbitration provision of the SPA Agreement because of the
agreement's relation to the parties' claims regarding the golf
course development project and specially planned area.

II.

Has Wolf waived its right to arbitration?
"Extrajudicial resolution7' of disputes is to be encouraged

"when the parties have not agreed to litigation."
County

Sch.

Dist.

, 892 P.2d

1063,

1065

(Utah Ct.

Reed

App.

v.

Davis

1995).

There

is "a strong presumption against waiver of the right to arbitrate."
Baker

v.

Stevens,

2005

UT 32,

1112-13

(Utah 2005).

Waiver of a

right to arbitrate must be intentional, but may be inferred "if the
facts demonstrate that the party seeking to enforce arbitration
intended to disregard its right to arbitrate."
Inc.

v.

Parkwest

Assocs.,

2002 UT 3,

Cent. Fla.

124 (Utah 2002).

determined by examining (a) "whether the party [seeking

24

Invs.,

This is

a r b 1 1: r a 1 1 o n ] s i i b s t a i 111 a ] ] y p a r 1 1 c :i p a t e d :i i 1 ] j 1 1 g a t i o i 1 1: o a p o :i i : I:
inconsistent with t h e intent to arbitrate;" and if so, (b) "whether
that participation resulted in prejudice to the oooosinq party..
Chandler

v. B lue

Cross

Blue

Siu>~±a, bJj

i . ..:a \ t , ..or {o.aa /.. }) .

A. Has Wolf Substantially p a r t i c i p a t e d in Litigation to a
Point Inconsistent wi th the Intent to Arbitrate?

A p a r t "v s i i b s t a i I t 1 a ] 3 y p a r t i c j p a t e s :i i i ] :i t i g a t :i o i I t c a j: : • :i i I t
inconsistent with ah i..; • ,a to arbitrate when the party's actions
demonstrate "M: intent to submit :
c

•

2002

•.' - \( - r e ire.*-

U'J 3,

126.

' -

v

the uirisdiction u: the court
<c. ,

,\.:

Parties actions to be considered in order of

weight from lowest to highest are,

vx

a party's intent or attitude

t ow a r d :i t s p a r t i c i p a t i o it I :i i I .1 11 i g a. t i oi I •

r e q\ i e s t s nia d e o f 11 I e

•court by the p a r t i e s / ' and "whether the p a r t i e s 1 requests of the
court demonstrate an intent to pursue litigation or whether they
demonstrate ai I i * > i <:=i\ i 1: 1:o avoi d 1 itigati oi i ai id a desIre to be sei 11
to arbitrate.'7"
participating
filing a ?ka

Chandler,

filing an answer and cross-claim and

**% -5nd reviewing discovery for five months prior to
:

Compel Arbitration was inconsistent with an

intent to arbitrate.

Additionally, i n Smile

B r i t e Sm i 1 e, 2 G 0 5 U T App 3 81,

Inc.

Asia

v.

11 i e c o i i r t I I e 3 d 1.1: I a t f j ] :i i I q a i I d a r q i i .i i I q
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motions to dismiss with supporting memoranda, filing a
counterclaim, filing memoranda in opposition to its opponents
motions, filing joint scheduling orders, filing a motion for a
protective order of certain discovery, serving several requests for
discovery, taking and defending depositions of multiple witnesses,
and engaging in correspondence with opposing counsel regarding
discovery issues were are all actions inconsistent with an intent
to arbitrate.

However, in Central

Florida

Investments,

the court

held that the party seeking to compel arbitration did not waive its
right to arbitration when it engaged in litigation because it did
so unwillingly, without any intent to disregard this right.

2002

UT 2, 531. This was evidenced by the fact that the party seeking
to compel arbitration expressed and communicated its desire to
arbitrate by letter to opposing counsel three days after it
received notice of the complaint, in its motion to dismiss and
supporting memoranda, and presented the existence of the
arbitration agreement as a reason to find in its favor in its
counterclaim.

Id. at 130.

Wolf posits that a waiver of arbitration must be intentional,
and that it did not intentionally waive arbitration because it was
not aware of its right to arbitration under the SPA Agreement until
this Court's April 29, 2009 Ruling, which immediately resulted in
Wolf asserting its right.

Regardless of Wolf's awareness, a waiver

of the right to arbitration may be inferred by a parties' actions
26

which demonstrate substai 11 i a] part:i c ipati en 1 :i i i J :i t:i g a t :i or 1 1:o a
point inconsistent with the intent to arbitrate.

The ASC Parties

contend that instead of immediately moving to compel arbitration,
Wolf filed a motion to dismiss, and after that was derlied, fi led
its own separate suit, answer and counterclaim.

Wolf also failed

to rai se the i:i g 1 1 t: tc • arb:i 1:ration as an affirmative defense.
has extensively litigated this case over the past three years.

Wolf
A

brief review of the docket for these consolidated cases shows that
Wo 1 f has taken a<,t uais i i Iconsistei It w:i 1:\ I a r i, :i i Itei I t to arb:i trate by
conducting discovery for about three years, taking and defending
numerous depositions, and extensive motion practice, similar t
wi lat occi irred :i i i Smi Ie

I I ::ic. A :
=

consumes 37 volumes, growing daily.
Central

Florida

Investments,

!

•

i'ni IK- wnat. occurred

m

Wolf has failed to ensure that the

court and parties involved were aware of i ts i i itei it to seek
arbitration.

Therefore, Wolf's actions during the past three

years recr.u-.;.. f these consolidated cases have demonstrated its
willingness tie engage in 1itigation to a point inconsistent with an
intent to arbitrate.
Ifiust be determined whether the ASC Parties
woui.i be prejudiced by arbitration.

B. Has ASCU shown there is prejudice if arbitration is
ordered?

"Prejudice [to the opposing party] must result from a [seeking
party's] delay in the assertion of the right to arbitrate, not from
factors that are inherent in arbitration itself."
P.2d

at

359.

Chandler,

833

"Prejudice can occur if a party gains an advantage in

arbitration through participation in pretrial procedures."

It

also occurs "where the party seeking arbitration allows the
opposing party to undergo the types of expenses that arbitration is
designed to alleviate, such as the expense of preparing to argue...
pretrial motions or... of conducting discovery procedures that are
not available in arbitration."

The ASC Parties point to Wolf's

participation in a broad discovery and motion practice that would
not have been available in arbitration as evidence that the ASC
Parties have been prejudiced by Wolf's failure to request
arbitration in a timely manner.

Additionally, the parties have

spent three years undertaking must of the expense necessary to
complete discovery and prepare for trial.

There has been an

enormous push with countless depositions, local and in several
states, occurring during the months of May and June, to end within
days of this ruling.

The ASC Parties argue, especially when

considering that Wolf has asserted claims in this litigation
against third parties that are not signatories to the SPA Agreement
28

:i i i a d d i t :i o i 1 t: c 1:1: 1 e e x 1: e i I s I v e d :i s c o r e r y a i I d n i, o t :i : i I p r a c t :i c. e, 11 I a 1: :i t
is too late to consider efficiency and conservation of resources.
Thus,
Par tit

'.*• p o l i c i e s favoring arbitration are d e f e a t e d and the ASC
•.;.•••

intend ro,

•
i;

••• •-•

n e c a u s e Wc: •] f f eeJ s ti lat :i 1: clli d i: i : t

--;-is thus incapable of waiving its rights to

arbitration under- *-h^ '"••" Agreement, it did not to refute the ASC
Parties' claims that

.^s been prejudiced 1: y Wo.1 f's dej ay

asserting its right to arbitration.

:i • 1

Hence, when looking at the

extent of discovery and m o t i o n practice that has occurred over the
past three years and the expense of this litigation to the parties
at this point, the court finds and concludes that the A S C Parties
have b e e n p r e j \ 1 d J c e d t • ;y W o J f' s J a t e a s s e r t i o 1 1 ::) f

; r :i g 1 11 1: o

arbitrate under the SPA Agreement.

CONCI .1 JSION
In short, although W o l f may have a right to arbitration of
issues i n dispute in this case under the SPA A g r e e m e n t , its actions
o v e 1: 11 1 e p a s t 11 1 r e e ye a 1: s 1 1 a v e f a :i 1: e d t: c c oirti 1: 1.1 1.1 1 :i c a t e a 1 :i it 1 11: e 1 1 1 I: ::»
arbitrate while heavily participating in m a n y facets of J itigation.
Allowing Wolf to assert its rights to arbitration this late in the
11

.> 1 d p 1: e j 1:1 d i c e 11 1 e A S C I ' a 1 t: :i e s b e c a 1 1 s e 11 1 e > 1: 1 a v e s p e r 11 1:1 1 r e e

y e a r s e n g a g i n g in h i g h ] y c o n t e s t e d l i t i g a t i o n , w i t h t h e a p p o i n t m e n t
of a special m a s t e r needed because of a failure to be able to
resolve discovery disputes between the p a r t i e s . Furthermore,

arbitration would not resolve all disputes in this case because
this case involves third parties that are not signatories of the
SPA Agreement.

The core claims in this case, by each party,

revolve around the Ground Lease and issues surrounding the golf
course, important though they may be, are somewhat collateral to
those main issues of other alleged breaches. The reasons Utah
courts favoring arbitration, expedience and conservation of
resources, would be largely defeated by conducting arbitration this
late.

Wolf has waived its right to arbitration by its actions up

to this juncture, and it Motion to Compel Arbitration should be
denied.

The motion to compel arbitration is DENIED.

This Ruling and Order is the Order of the court and no other
order is required.
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